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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Modern African “ethno-national” diasporas of today are very different from 
the “old” black diaspora which emerged out of the slave trade. Contemporary 
migrants are very much in touch with their homeland, to which they often 
remit money on a regular basis. They have an economic and political role to 
play in the countries of departure as well as arrival. In the homeland, they 
can contribute to development and democracy, especially in enclaves, island 
micro-states and war-torn countries which record disproportionate emigration 
flows. Yet the governments of developing countries are not fully aware of 
the opportunities that these migrant communities offer. Most of them still 
consider their nationals abroad as a nuisance, either because they resent the 
“brain drain” or because of the political threat they represent, especially to 
authoritarian regimes. Indeed some African diasporas back armed struggles, 
terrorist groups, and criminal organisations. However, one must be careful not 
to overemphasize their contribution either to development and democratic 
transitions or to disruptive forces.
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INTRODUCTION
In a global world in which some 125 million people migrate from one country to 
another every year, modern African “ethno-national” diasporas are quite different 
from the “old” black diasporas which historically emerged out of the slave trade.1 
Contemporary migrants are very much in touch with their homelands, to which 
they often remit money on a regular basis. They also have a political role to play 
in both their homelands and the countries to which they have migrated. They 
can contribute to development and reconstruction in the former, especially in 
impoverished enclaves, island micro-states and war-ravaged countries which are 
particularly prone to exceptionally high emigration flows. They can also help to 
alleviate the sufferings of their fellow countrymen at home during humanitarian 
crises. In a failed state like Somalia, for instance, nationals who took refuge 
abroad provided a kind of welfare system during the civil war for those of their 
relatives who had remained in the Horn of Africa after 1991. In the same way, 
the Malians of Kayes who were living in France demonstrated how important a 
part expatriates could play by their interventions in Mali during the droughts of 
1973 and 1984. And in Lesotho, where a state of famine was declared in April 
2002, some analysts argue that the food crisis was caused, not by drought or bad 
harvests, but by a drop in remittances.
As public aid and structural adjustment programmes have proved unable to 
develop the continent, the issue is: are remittances going to “save” Africa? 
Before discussing this question, the author intends to provide a context within 
which funding from nationals living abroad can be seen as a positive factor. 
Financial transfers to the homeland by migrants have several advantages for 
the recipient countries:
• They can contribute to sustainable development since they are more 
endogenous than international aid;
• Through community networking, remittances can help to reduce poverty 
and the other detrimental effects on society of a globalisation process 
dominated by market values. They narrow the trade gap and break the 
isolation of countries in which foreign investment is low;
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• Such transfers assist African countries with debt servicing, increase 
foreign currency reserves, and partly compensate for the flight of capital. 
According to the World Bank, the total value of official remittances reached 
US$80 billion in 2002, as against US$60 billion in 1998, and it is likely 
to continue to rise. This is less than the amount earned by the oil trade, 
but probably equal to the turnover from drug trafficking. Of course, such 
inflows cannot be compared with fixed investments. Migrants’ financial 
transfers are not sufficient to pay off the Third World’s debt or to reverse 
the flight of capital from developing countries.2 But unofficial remittances 
that are sent via friends, relatives or private courier systems could amount 
to two or three times the official figure. As private capital flows have 
declined, they have become the second-largest source of external funding 
for developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI);
• Remittances account for a substantial proportion of the incomes of states. 
In Mali, for instance, they funded 81% of the trade gap and contributed 
17% of public aid to development in 1991. Since the 1980s, money sent 
from abroad has represented three times the average amount provided by 
official aid in Lesotho. In Cape Verde during the last decade, funds sent 
home by the diaspora were four times the value of international aid that 
stood at US$325 per capita in 1990. 
The analysis of the effects of remittances, must also include research at local 
level. A serious impediment to such a study is that developing countries are 
not fully aware of the opportunities offered to them by the presence of some 
of their citizens in other countries, and moreover they do not consider the 
“brain drain” as a potential asset. Some of them still see their nationals abroad 
as a nuisance, because migrant communities often represent a political threat 
to authoritarian regimes at home. The role that African diasporas can play in 
the development of their countries of origin is not obvious, and is dependent 
on the way in which they invest their money. Moreover, the contribution 
of migrant communities to democratic transitions at home remains doubtful. 
It is also important to remember that remittances can be used to launder 
money, support terrorist activities and mask the activities of organised crime 
syndicates.
This study attempts to assess the strategic value that remittances have in African 
countries situated south of the Sahara. In the first part, the focus is on political 
interaction between migrant communities and their homelands. Conspiracies, 
armed struggles and voting lobbies are not the only forms such interventions 
take: more subtle patterns of politics in exile are developed through ethnic 
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transnational networks, cultural exchanges and economic influence. All things 
being equal, the relative significance of remittances to a national economy can 
confer a political role on a country’s diaspora, especially if the contributions 
made by the expatriates come with conditions.
Yet numbers are not the sole determinant of influence in the homeland, as 
is shown by the case studies in the second part of this monograph. In micro-
states such as Cape Verde, the Comores and Lesotho, which depend heavily 
on their diasporas, the political and developmental effects of financial transfers 
are largely contingent on the receptivity of the homeland’s government. Any 
link between migrants’ political involvement and political transitions at home is 
questionable, because internal pressure is the main force for change. In Cape 
Verde, the diaspora played a major role in bringing to an end the one-party 
system in 1991 because the state was ready and able to channel remittances 
towards promoting foreign investment. But in the Comores, the diaspora 
seems to be as disorganised as the state. Lesotho is an intermediary case. 
These examples illustrate how difficult it would be to make generalisations on 
the impact that migrant communities have on governance and development 
at home. 
Moreover, one should be aware of the possible criminal use of diaspora 
networks for money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, scams or 
terrorist activities. The globalisation of mafia-like syndicates, which is analyzed 
in the third part of this study, can have severe consequences for migrant 
communities, as in Nigeria. But one should not overemphasise the criminal 
elements among those Africans who are part of the diaspora. Since the 
countries of the industrialised world have closed their borders to refugees and 
migrants, a good number of aliens have become “illegal”: that is, they have 
been denied citizenship or formal residence permits. Yet illegality is different 
from criminality, illegitimacy or unreliability. The focus of the police on illegal 
immigrants tends to outlaw any informal economic activities, including the 
sending of remittances. And cultural stereotypes of foreigners, especially black 
people do not help industrial countries understand the value of transnational 
expatriate networks, whether legitimate or criminal.
Notes
1 By referring to diasporas in the plural, as opposed to the singular ‘black diaspora’, 
the author refers to migrant communities that have a common origin (such as a 
national or ethnic background), and that produce trans-national networks con-
necting them with their homelands. For an historical review, see M-A Pérouse de 
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Montclos, Les diasporas africaines et leur pays d’origine, Esprit, 27 (300), 2003, 
pp114–24.
2 In Nigeria alone, the World Bank estimated that US$15 billion could be found in 
foreign bank accounts at the end of the 1990s; but, according to other sources, 
the sum may be as much as US$55 million.
CHAPTER 1
AFRICAN DIASPORAS AND HOMELAND 
POLITICS
From slave trade to modern migration
Globalisation is not a new phenomenon. Today on average, just under 3% 
of the world’s inhabitants migrate from one country to another every year1, 
a proportion roughly equivalent to the annual growth rate of the world’s 
population. Yet invasions, settlements and forced displacements also took 
place on a large scale during the early part of the Christian era. Moreover, 
some migration patterns have not changed much. Nigerians, for instance, 
constituted the biggest African community in America for many centuries. The 
difference is that slaves were not referred to as Nigerians two or three centuries 
ago, while African migrants are now registered according to their nationalities. 
As Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, the predominance of people 
from that country is not surprising. The 70,000 Nigerians who officially settled 
in the United States (US) between 1974–1995 represented 17% of African 
immigrants, followed, in descending order, by the Ethiopians, the South 
Africans and the Ghanaians.2 
Interestingly enough, this percentage was nearly the same during the time 
of the slave trade. After Angola and Congo, which supplied up to 70% of 
the slaves in Brazil in the seventeenth century, today’s Nigeria became one 
of the main reservoirs of labour for traders of all nationalities. They landed 
on the coast at ports ranging from Calabar, near Cameroon, to Ouidah, the 
outlet of the kingdom of Dahomey. The latter was the main export centre for 
Yoruba prisoners of war whose homeland was the neighbouring Oyo Empire, 
especially in the years between 1700–1730.3 According to the shipping 
registers, the Bights of Benin and Biafra accounted for 14,5% and 25,1% of the 
human cargo which was shipped across the Atlantic under British or French 
flags between 1711–1810.4
In other words, many of the black peoples now inhabiting the Americas and 
the Caribbean are of Nigerian descent. The latter supplied 1% of the slaves 
who arrived in Peru between 1548–1560; 5% to Mexico at the end of the 
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seventeenth century; almost 9% in British Guyana between 1803–1807; 6% 
to the US between 1690–1807; 42% to Jamaica between 1655–1807; 60% to 
French Guyana in 1690; more than 36% to Santo Domingo between 1751–
1800; and 41% to Cuba between 1817–1843.5 Because they lived near the 
coastline of the Bights of Benin and Biafra, the Yoruba, the Ijaw and the Ibibio 
in the hinterland were the first to be sent into slavery. In Santo Domingo, the 
Yoruba constituted 26,2% of the slaves who landed between 1760–1800, as 
compared with 21,8% for the Nupe, Somba, Chamba, Hausa and Gbari of 
Northern Nigeria. According to a census held in 1848 in Freetown, 63,7% 
of the slaves who were freed and settled in Sierra Leone by the British were 
also Yorouba, Nupe or Edo, with a few Fon and Goun from Dahomey. Of 
the remainder, 20,2% were from the Ibo, the Efik, the Ibibio and the Hausa 
tribes.6
From a quantitative point of view, these massive movements of population 
were much more striking than the African migrations of the present day, and 
one must bear that in mind so as not to over-emphasize the effects of modern 
globalisation. In similar vein, political interactions between emigrants and 
their homelands are not as recent as one might believe. Historically, Africa 
south of the Sahara has often been perceived as an isolated continent. Yet 
the slave trade influenced and even shaped political power in the countries of 
departure as well as those of arrival. In Latin America, deported communities 
helped with rebellions against colonial authorities. In Brazil for instance, 
Muslim Hausa from Nigeria led the Bahia uprisings of 1720, 1806, 1809, 
1813, 1818, 1822, 1827, 1835 and 1838. Organized in secret societies called 
ogboni, they established fugitive slave communities, the quilombos, and tried 
to set up an Islamic state in the Nordeste.7 This early political manifestation 
of Islam was connected with the jihad in Nigeria, the Muslim holy war which 
devastated Northern Yorubaland’s hinterland and supplied the slave exporters 
on the coast with Hausa prisoners of war.
The transatlantic slave trade also had political consequences for Africa. First, 
returnees funded the republics of Liberia in 1847 and Sierra Leone in 1787.8 
Secondly, the slave trade sustained artificial city-states on the coast, and 
aggravated conflicts with communities in the hinterland, where people were 
kidnapped to be sold to the Europeans. In the Bight of Biafra, these cleavages 
between the coast and the hinterland are still apparent.9 Secondly, slave 
returnees were to form a political elite of freemen whose status owed much 
to their education in the West. In the Bight of Benin, retornados from Brazil 
mixed with Portuguese traders, and played a leading role in the nationalist 
movement leading up to that country’s gaining its independence. As for the 
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influence the Arab world had on Africans sold into slavery in the north of Africa 
and the Middle East, its impact was considerable, because Islam became the 
dominant religion in many areas. In the Horn of Africa, it produced city-states 
on the coast; in the Sahel, it gave birth to an urban elite, especially in Kano, 
the most populated city in Northern Nigeria. There the name of the district 
of Madigawa still refers to the madugu, the leader of a caravan across the 
Sahara.
Of course, political interactions between emigrants and their homelands 
are more sophisticated and developed today. This is not only because of 
technological progress in communication and transport. From a cultural 
point of view, contemporary migrants are not as uprooted as those who were 
forced into an alien world in the past. The slave trade had contributed to a 
transfer or assimilation of ethnic identities. In the Arab world, African domestic 
workers were converted to Islam and integrated into the community, although 
they were stigmatized. In the Americas, segregation produced a race-based 
“community of suffering”. Ethnic identities were irremediably changed, mixed 
up and diluted. In the Caribbean islands, for instance, groups from Eastern 
Nigeria were called by different names: the Ibo became Eboe; the Ibibio, Bibi 
or Mocoe.10 In Cuba, the Ekpe secret cult society from the Efik of Calabar 
took another name, Abakuá, in 1836. Despite the Marxist regime of Fidel 
Castro, that cult is still active today, with 117 cells and some 20,000 followers, 
75% of them in Havana. But its traditional priests (oku ndem) and chiefs 
(eyamba) do not now retain any link with the country of origin of the Efik slave 
communities.11
Politics in exile: Oppositions, plots and elections
In contrast, “modern” emigrants—including asylum seekers who are the 
victims of forced displacements—can retain close ties with their homelands. 
Their loyalty to both the countries of departure and arrival depends on a 
variety of determinants.12 In some cases, migrants back the opposition in exile, 
support armed struggles at home, or exercise their votes in the mother country 
(if elections are ever held there, and they have the right to cast a ballot). 
They often form national or ethnic lobbies that plead for more international 
aid to their homelands, or for economic sanctions to be imposed against an 
authoritarian regime at home. Some African authors argue that the “old” black 
diaspora could also relay similar messages to promote the economic interests 
and the foreign policy of various countries on the African continent.13 But in 
many cases, Afro–Americans and modern migrant communities lobby only for 
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their rights in their new homes. In France, for instance, Comorean immigrants 
are said to vote for conservative parties in the hope of retaining their privileges, 
as 80% of them are French citizens. In Africa too, most migrant communities 
maintain a low profile. In exchange for the promise of permanent residence 
and identity documents, Basotho migrant workers voted for the African 
National Congress (ANC) during the 1994 elections in South Africa; and in 
Kenya, Somali refugees did the same for the ruling party in 1997 and 2002.14
It seldom happens that migrant communities play a decisive political role in 
the homeland, even if their marginal vote can sometimes cause a change of 
majority when the ballot is closely contested, as happened with the diaspora 
from Cape Verde in January 2001.15 Very often, migrants are not allowed to 
vote at all. This exclusion is not restricted to authoritarian regimes: some South 
African expatriates were disenfranchised during the 1994, 1999 and 2004 
elections. To claim their right to vote while resident outside the country, as 
stipulated in the law, they had to organize a lobby to argue that they still paid 
taxes at home, and therefore should be entitled to cast their ballots like South 
African diplomats abroad. 
However, there are many ways to participate in elections without casting a formal 
vote. Nigerians living in the US pledged they would send US$2,5 million to the 
candidate who would defend their interests in America during the presidential 
elections in 2003.16 The problems of Nigerians living abroad became an issue 
raised by parties like the Alliance for Democracy. Local politicians complained 
about emigrants being put in jail, for instance, and asked the Nigerian embassies 
in other countries to do more for nationals away from home.17
The situation is of course rather different in countries where there are no 
elections at all. Many rebel movements are launched in exile because of 
political repression or crisis in the homeland. Some of these use the countries 
of asylum as places from which they can inform against a dictatorship at 
home.18 Others plot against or support armed struggles. From neighbouring 
countries especially, refugees have various opportunities to launch guerrilla 
attacks against the authoritarian regimes that caused them to flee.19 As for 
emigrants abroad, it is often quite easy for them to fight by proxy (since they 
do not suffer directly in the conflict) by financing military operations (because 
they are usually richer than their relatives in the homeland). 
In their desire to revive “original” roots and “lost” identities, expatriates can 
be extremely radical. Economists from the World Bank assert that the more 
powerful a diaspora is, the more likely it is that a civil war will be prolonged. 
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According to them, the probability that a conflict will resume during the five 
years following a cease-fire or a peace settlement is increased sixfold if a strong 
migrant community has an interest.20
Yet the political influence of diasporas is not restricted to the use of violence. 
More subtle feedback can change the situation in the homeland. Some authors 
notice a feminisation of migration, which often implies an empowerment of 
women. This helps to close the gender gap, and alters the balance of power 
in patriarchal societies.21 Because of the high level of abandonment and 
divorce of wives amongst Basotho men working in South Africa, for instance, 
it became more common for women to migrate out of Lesotho. According to 
some researchers, “their exchange of sexual services for money or evasion of 
the law” enabled them to bribe their way around the immigration regulations, 
and made it more difficult for the authorities to control their migration than 
that of males.22 In contrast to the patriarchal nature of society in Lesotho, 
these women encountered “greater gender equality and women’s rights to 
individual property and self-expression” in South Africa.
Refugee diasporas are also indicative of this trend towards feminisation, since 
civil wars usually produce many widows, who are then compelled to take 
over “male” responsibilities.23 With the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 
Mogadishu in 1991, for example, Somali elders first sent boys abroad, because 
tradition favoured privileging the education of the older male siblings. They 
did this partly because they feared that if they remained, the young men would 
be forced to fight, or would become targeted victims. But according to a study 
by the United Nations (UN), an increasing number of unaccompanied girls 
were then sent overseas, since they were believed to be “more trusted” and 
“more productive” than their male siblings, who “were more likely to slip into 
criminal behaviour and fail to send money home”.24
Although the conditions under which migrants live in the country of arrival 
explain social changes within these communities, their reasons for leaving the 
homeland also contribute to these alterations. In Nigeria during the regime 
of Sani Abacha (1993–1998), ethnic groups like the Yoruba, who backed the 
civilian opposition, and the Ogoni, who protested against their exploitation by 
foreign oil companies, were deliberately targeted. It is estimated that 30,000 
Ogoni sought asylum abroad, 1,000 of them in Cotonou, in neighbouring 
Benin.25 These persecutions produced “ethnic communities of suffering”, 
which reinforced clan identities.26 Unlike the National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO), which opposed Sani Abacha within the national political system, 
organisations like Egbe Omo Yoruba or the Oodua People’s Congress tried to 
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garner support from Yoruba migrants only, in America as well as in Europe. 
Also, a Southern Minorities Front was set up in the US to lobby for the interests 
of the Ogoni and the coastal populations of Eastern Nigeria in opposition to 
those of the oil companies and the military.
Two main schools of thought exist on this subject. One reasons that the greater 
involvement of diasporas in ethnic issues is attributable to the revival of cultural 
values, which in turn is the result of the decline in ideology that accompanied 
the end of the Cold War.27 The other school of thought argues that migrant 
communities contribute to nation building.28 Whatever the case, contexts of 
identification go from the smallest to the largest. Only at the global level does 
a sense of national belonging prevail. Region and lineage supply identity at the 
state and the local levels. Thus an Ijebu living in Lagos will tend to emphasise 
the specificity of his sub-clan within the Yoruba “family”. But in Northern 
Nigeria, which is predominantly Hausa, he will be perceived as a Yoruba first. 
And travelling abroad, he will be seen as a Nigerian citizen. This is why the 
national or ethnic orientation of migrant communities is so complex.
Politics in the homeland
The next issue to consider is whether the political activities of  diasporas have 
an impact in the homeland. The propaganda against authoritarian regimes 
produced by radical exiles often reveals important differences from the positions 
taken up by the internal opposition, and even, sometimes, misinterpretations 
of the situation at home. This is not specific to Africa. Ahmed Chalabi, a rich 
businessman and a leader of the opposition to Saddam Hussein in the US, 
was extremely badly received when he was brought back in Iraq by American 
troops after April 2003. In Kabul, the government of President Hamid Karzaï 
was divided between members of the Northern Alliance, who had fought 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and returnees from the Southern Pashtun 
diaspora. In the constitution published in January 2004, a compromise solution 
had to be adopted to make it compulsory for ministers with double nationality 
to be approved by parliament.
Such cleavages have also been apparent in political movements south of the 
Sahara. After 1990, the ANC had to manage tensions between “outsiders” 
and “insiders”. The former were the returned guerrilla fighters of Umkhonto 
we Sizwe, who had fought the apartheid regime from Angola or Mozambique; 
the latter, civics, who had organised the uprising within the South African 
townships. Exiles sometimes lack legitimacy in their own country on their 
11Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos
return, as they have had no access to the population in the homeland. 
In Ethiopia, for instance, the Mengistu regime fell in 1991 because of the 
actions of guerrillas in Tigray and Eritrea, and not because of the opposition 
it faced abroad. The Ogaden National Liberation Front was able to hold its 
first congress in the Somali Region of Ethiopia only in 1992, almost ten years 
after it was created by exiles in the Gulf in 1984. (It was officially launched in 
Kuwait in 1986).
Again, in Nigeria during Sani Abacha’s dictatorship, NADECO, a civilian 
opposition coalition which was set up in Lagos in May 1994 and afterwards 
opened branches abroad, was torn between “outsiders” and “insiders”. 
Amongst the professional politicians who had gone into exile were Wole 
Soyinka, the first black African writer to have won a Nobel prize; Anthony 
Enahoro, who had fought for independence before 1960; Bolaji Akinyemi, a 
former foreign affairs minister; Bola Tinubu, who had been a senator during 
the short-lived Third Republic in 1992; and Cornelius Adebayo and John 
Oyegun, former governors of the Kwara and Edo States. Kudirat (the wife of 
Moshood Abiola, the elected president who was put in jail by the military in 
June 1994) became their icon when she was murdered in June 1996. Exiles 
launched a “Radio Kudirat” (later renamed Radio NADECO) to broadcast 
short-wave programmes attacking the government. They lobbied the New 
York town council to rename 43rd Street, in which the Nigerian embassy was 
located, Kudirat Avenue. They were also instrumental in bringing about the 
commercial boycotting of the Abacha regime by the municipalities of Oakland 
(in California) and Amherst (in Massachusetts).29 Wole Soyinka, who advocated 
armed struggle, was one of the most radical of the political exiles. He chaired 
both the National Liberation Council of Nigeria and the United Democratic 
Front of Nigeria, based in Pittsburgh.
But these moves were mainly symbolic. No guerrilla movement ever developed 
within Nigeria. The regime eventually collapsed when Sani Abacha suddenly 
died in 1998. As a matter of record, Nigerians did not expect much from the 
opposition abroad. Instead a good number of them believed that the exiles 
lived in comfort, accumulated wealth and took advantage of international 
sympathy for their exile status. They also suspected that some migrants had 
posed as political opponents of the regime at home to gain asylum and 
permission to stay in the West.30 The elections of 1999 and the return to a 
civilian regime did not change this attitude. The leader of the radical faction 
of the Oodua People’s Congress explained to the author that because the 
membership cards distributed to his followers had been used and abused to 
seek political asylum abroad, he had to stop issuing them.31 As for another 
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underground organisation, the Movement for the Actualisation of a Sovereign 
State of Biafra (MASSOB), which started to fight for the independence of Biafra 
after 1999, it became more popular amongst the Ibo members of the diaspora 
than at home.
Interestingly, the suspiciousness with which exiles were regarded at home also 
extended to the descendants of the “old” black diaspora that had emerged out 
of the slave trade. In Nigeria, civil society did not trust black Americans who 
opposed Sani Abacha: some human rights activists even denounced “those 
delegations of dubious con men and women who had fed fat on our blood 
and misfortune”!32 In Kenya too, members of parliament refused to pass a bill 
that would have automatically granted Kenyan citizenship to Afro–American 
applicants. At independence, a westernised politician like Tom Mboya, 
who visited Harlem, publicly opposed immigration schemes in which black 
Americans would settle in Africa, because he did not believe that their wish 
to return to an idealised homeland was sincere. He regarded the project as 
merely a pretext to escape the urban ghettos of America.33 
African migrant workers also aroused a great deal of hostility in their home 
governments. Nationals earning a living abroad represented a direct challenge 
to dictators, because the implication was that the development policies at 
home were failing. This was especially true of so-called progressive regimes 
like the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, which forbade emigration in 
1973, ostensibly to contain the brain drain. Under President Jafaar al-Numayri, 
for instance, the Socialist government of Sudan passed the Passports and 
Immigration Regulation Act of 1970, which stipulated that exit visas should be 
issued only by the Ministry of Employment; Decree 950 of 1980 restricted the 
validity of passports, and another, 102 of 1985, established a state secretariat 
for emigration. As for the Marxist Ethiopia of Haile Mariam Mengistu, citizens 
who attempted to leave the country without due authorisation were liable 
to sentences of between five and 25 years in prison, because they were 
considered to be counter-revolutionaries according to Article 21 of the penal 
code of 1981.
Authoritarianism was certainly one of the major reasons why migrant 
communities were ostracized. When Sudan gained independence, parliament 
created a special “graduate” constituency, to attract the vote of the elite 
members of the diaspora. But this was short-lived, as the successive military 
governments that followed, especially the Islamic junta that came to power 
in 1989, considered all nationals abroad as potential opponents. During the 
1996 elections, for instance, parties representing exiles were not allowed to 
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compete. Instead, voters were registered on the basis of the sugar ration cards 
distributed by the regime (which made it impossible for nationals living out of 
the country to vote).34 In the same way, the junta of Sani Abacha in Nigeria 
did not allow the diaspora any share in the “national cake”. It even took action 
against one of its neighbours, the Republic of Benin, where many members of 
the Nigerian opposition had previously sought and obtained refuge, by backing 
the election campaign of a former dictator, Mathieu Kérékou. In February 
1996, before the polls opened, Sani Abacha closed the border and gave one 
million dollars to Kérékou. Such support was based not so much on regional 
solidarity (because both men came from the Northern Sahel) as on political 
interference, because Benin’s outgoing president, Nicéphore Soglo, had given 
protection to Nigerians fleeing Abacha’s regime.35
Even though many transitions to democracy took place in Africa during the 
1990s, many of these governments continued to exclude migrant communities 
from taking part in domestic politics. However, this phenomenon is not specific 
to developing countries south of the Sahara. In Algeria during the legislative 
elections of 2002, only eight seats out of 389 were kept for representatives of 
the diaspora, including four for the migrants living in France. And in Morocco 
that same year, the polls, which were described as the first democratic 
election in the kingdom, did not include the votes of the 2,5 million workers 
abroad. This omission was all the more significant because their remittances 
constituted one of the country’s two main sources of hard currency, the 
other being tourism. In Latin America also, Mexico changed its constitution 
in 1996 to allow émigré nationals to vote and hold dual citizenship. But the 
amendment became a dead letter because no enabling law was introduced 
to bring it into force before the elections, which are due in 2006. As for El 
Salvador, where one citizen out of three lives in North America, in 2004 the 
government refused to allow members of the diaspora to vote, despite the 
great contributions of nationals abroad to the country’s economy.
In Africa south of the Sahara, transitions to democracy caused some 
authoritarian regimes to allow multi-party elections. Yet many national 
diasporas were excluded from participation while they were perceived as 
supporting the opposition parties. In 2000, President Robert Mugabe did not 
allow Zimbabwean emigrants to vote. The official reason given was that it 
would have been too expensive to register one million nationals abroad, but the 
unofficial explanation is that a large number of them had moved to the “new” 
South Africa, and were suspected of not supporting the government’s party. 
In the Seychelles, which were under a one-party system between 1977–1992, 
President France Albert René was also reluctant to allow migrant communities 
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in the UK, Canada and Australia to vote, since they were expected to support 
the opposition, the Seychelles National Party. 
Regimes that had moved from a one-party to a more democratic system 
included diasporas in the franchise when they thought that migrant communities 
would support them, and show loyalty to the leaders of those groups that 
had fought for independence. In Mozambique after the 1999 elections, the 
Marxist Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) found that its support 
had weakened. To avoid losing power, it looked for alternative constituencies 
abroad, while the opposition was poorly organized. FRELIMO created an 
institute, Instituto Nacional de Apoio ao Emigrante Moçambicano no Exterior 
(INAME), to promote the return of members of the diaspora, and planned to 
permit emigrants to vote during the presidential elections of 2004.
Economic power and remittances
Of course, the transnational influence of diasporas is not limited to ballots. At 
this juncture, it is relevant to consider the economic—and maybe political— 
power that migrant communities exercise through remittances. Such financial 
transfers are a global phenomenon from the Philippines to Albania, the poorest 
country in Europe, to which some 700,000 emigrants remit some US$650 
million per year, and in so doing provide 60% of the state’s income. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean Islands, migrants sent home US$30 billion in 2002 
and US$38 billion in 2003. This was more than the sums produced by foreign 
investment and public aid for development in the region. According to the 
Inter-American Development Bank, one South American out of every ten 
benefits from remessas. As for Northern Africa, figures from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) show that remittances constituted 9% of the GDP in 
Morocco, 5% in Tunisia and 3% in Egypt in 2003.
In Africa south of the Sahara, some economies are more reliant on remittances 
than others. (See the comparisons depicted in Figure 1.) All things being 
equal, war-torn countries, enclaves and island micro-states are the most 
obvious recipients of funds sent from abroad, because these countries record 
disproportionate emigration flows. Armed conflicts often produce huge 
diasporas—three inhabitants out of every four were displaced by the fighting 
in Somalia after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Many went into exile 
in neighbouring countries, the Arab world or the West.36 The United Nations 
High Commision for Refugees (UNHCR) registered 451,500 Somali refugees 
in 1999, or about 7% of the country’s estimated population of approximately 
15Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos
It should be noted that it is very difficult to compare one country with another, 
because there is no standardized statistical definition of what constitutes 
migrants’ financial transfers, especially as regards remittances in kind. Available 
data show considerable discrepancies, depending on the inclusion or the 
exclusion of informal remittances outside the banking sector. In Lesotho, for 
instance, the Central Bank computes only the remittances and the deferred 
Figure 1: Remittances and domestic economies in Mali, Comores,  
Cape Verde and Lesotho
Homeland
Rough  
no of emi-
grants 
and their 
descendants
Emigrants as 
a %  
of the  
resident 
population 
Main  
arrival points 
of the diaspo-
ra in decreas-
ing order of 
importance
Approx 
amount of 
remittances 
per year, in 
US $ millions
Remit- 
tances as % 
of the GDP
Mali 1, 000, 000 12% (1991)
Cote d’Ivoire
France
75, 7 (1991) 3 % (1991)
Comores 111, 000 25% (1991)
France
Madagascar
20 (2001) 12% (2001)
Cape Verde 483, 000 111% (2000)
USA
Portugal
Senegal
Netherlands
France
71, 8 (2001) 13% (2001)
Lesotho 700, 000 33% (2000) South Africa 200 (2001) 27% (2001)
Source: OECD, World Bank, IOM, Central Banks, National Census.
6 million. Although Somalia had received remittances from migrants before 
the war, the commensurate growth in the value of money sent home, which 
was of the order of US$140 million per year when calculated on the basis of 
individual savings in asylum countries, became very important. 37 According 
to surveys conducted within Somalia, the total could be as much as US$800 
million per year if commercial transactions and private financial transfers to 
other Somali communities in the Horn of Africa are included. Of this amount, 
US$360 million were private donations to family members. These provided 
more than 22% of the resources of households in Somalia.38
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payments of Basotho mine-workers in South Africa. Yet this figure is less than 
half the amount recorded by TEBA, a bank and the main recruiting agency 
for mine-workers in Lesotho, which includes remittances, deferred payments, 
pensions, compensations, awards for long service, and lump sums paid to 
the wives’ provident fund. Again, the TEBA data, which are limited to mine-
workers, account for less than half of the total of US$200 million that is 
estimated as the value of the informal and formal remittances sent home by 
Basotho migrants working in South Africa.
As for Africa’s little islands and enclaves, the relative economic weight of 
their diasporas is largely explained by the geographical peculiarities of their 
location. An enclave naturally depends on the country that surrounds it. Again, 
lack of space and overpopulation usually result in high rates of emigration from 
island micro-states. Between one-fourth and one-third of the population of 
Equatorial Guinea lives outside the country. The diaspora from the Seychelles, 
numbering approximately 40,000 people, equals more than half of the current 
inhabitants of the archipelago. 
The Comores and Cape Verde, which became independent in 1975 from the 
French and the Portuguese respectively, are interesting examples because their 
local economies are very heavily remittance-orientated. In Cape Verde, the 
size of the diaspora is larger than the population of the archipelago. The major 
source of remessas (remittances) is its migrant communities in the US, followed 
by those in Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland. 
These sums accounted for 28% of Cape Verde’s GDP in 1980, when the state 
had ruled out foreign private investment and became heavily dependent on 
international aid.39 Since then, the proportion contributed by remittances has 
fallen from 15% in 1986 to 10% in 2002. The main reasons have been growth 
in the national economy, restrictions on immigration in Europe or America, 
and the integration of Cape Verdeans in the host countries, where they have 
settled, married and spent their money. Yet remessas remain a major asset 
to the archipelago’s economy, totalling some US$67 million in 2000, US$72 
million in 2001, US$68 million in 2002 and US$64 million in 2003. This 
partly explains why the GDP per head is higher in Cape Verde than that of 
the other four former African Portuguese colonies combined. Cape Verde is 
the only Lusophone African nation to be ranked in the World Bank’s lower 
middle-income bracket. Moreover, the proportion of migrant bank deposits 
to GDP is on the rise, from 13% in 1995 to 23% in 2002. This compensates 
for the relative decline in remessas, and indicates a growth of confidence in 
the national economy following the end of the one-party system in 1991. As 
early as 1986, the national bank tried to attract migrants’ savings. Legislation 
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was introduced to open the economy to private external investment from 
emigrants in 1989, and then extended to all foreigners in 1993, when the 
first commercial bank, the Banco Comercial do Atlântico, was established. 
In March 1998, when Cape Verde and Portugal signed an agreement to the 
effect that their respective currencies would become linked through a fixed 
exchange rate, the Cape Verde escudo (CBE) became convertible to the euro.40 
Official investment from migrants was promoted through the provision of tax 
exemptions for returnees and attractive rates for bank deposits. At the same 
time, informal remessas, usually passed from hand to hand, decreased.
The Comores, another island micro-state where the national currency is easily 
convertible to euros, also relies on remittances. One citizen out of every four 
is said to live abroad, and migrants officially send home some 10 billion Francs 
Comoriens (FC) per year, approximately US$20 million. This is equivalent to 
the state’s resources and the official savings of the population in local banks. 
The Central Bank in Moroni sometimes records larger amounts than that. In 
2001, it had to change a total amount of FC15 billion into cash, owing to the 
conversion of French Francs’ savings into euros. The inflow of private capital 
has tripled over the last 20 years. It now represents 10% of the GDP and up 
to 50% of the value of imports. According to some analysts, it might even 
be as high as FC120 billion if one includes the goods sent home by migrants 
and the hoarding of gold or jewellery to pay for the great customary wedding 
ceremonies, which confer on the groom (in this case the returnee) the status 
of a “full man”.41
Of course, island micro-states are not the only small countries that produce big 
diasporas and depend on a high volume of remittances. An enclave within South 
Africa and a tiny mountainous kingdom with two million inhabitants, Lesotho 
is a classic example.42 During the 1860s, it lost large tracts of cultivable territory 
to, and was almost annexed by, the Orange Free State, a South African province 
on Lesotho’s border. The shortage and degradation of arable land made even 
subsistence crops difficult to grow, while the droughts, the Great Depression, 
and lack of development (as a result of colonial policy) virtually put an end to 
commercial agriculture in the 1930s. From that time onwards, Lesotho imported 
food and exported labour. As early as 1933, there were more Basotho male 
workers in South Africa than in Lesotho. During the apartheid era (which started 
in 1948) Lesotho came to serve as another Bantustan, a rural labour reserve for 
its “big brother”, especially in the mining industry.
Today, less than 13% of the land in Lesotho is cultivable, and, according to 
the 1999–2000 agricultural census, about 20% of Basotho household heads 
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work away from home, most of them out of the country. Some 175,000 
labour migrants were estimated to be in South Africa in the mid-1980s, and 
the total number of Basotho who live there now is said to be 700,000 when 
descendants, illegal immigrants, short-term sojourners, and Sesotho speakers 
with dual citizenship are included. 43 Remittances to Lesotho equalled up to 
50% of the GNP, 90% of the value of imports, almost 1,400% of exports and 
360% of the agricultural output in the 1980s.44 Some studies also showed that 
these financial transfers provided 80% of the income of rural households, in a 
country that had very few urban centres. Some 40% of peasants benefited from 
remittances, as against 15% of city dwellers.45 Each migrant worker supported 
between seven and nine people in Lesotho.
Such a dependency on South Africa, which absorbs 90% of Lesotho’s foreign 
trade, makes the latter very vulnerable.46 Given the relative importance of 
earnings from water royalties and miners’ remittances, the country’s GDP 
is typically about 60% of the GNP. Any variation in the volume of financial 
transfers has a dire effect on the local economy. Lesotho suffered greatly 
when large numbers of migrant workers lost their jobs because of the crisis 
in the mining industry starting at the end of the 1980s, and the subsequent 
introduction, after the collapse of the apartheid regime in 1994, of affirmative 
action programmes which favoured the employment of black South Africans.47 
The number of Lesotho miners in South Africa was reduced from 129,000 
in 1989 to 64,000 in 1999. During that decade some 61,000 unemployed 
Basotho returned to the kingdom. As a result, the contribution of remittances 
to the GDP fell from a maximum of 100% in the mid-1980s to 67% in 1990, 
33% in 1996 and 27% in 2001, while unemployment rose to 45%.48
What’s in a remittance? Some determinants
Several parameters fix the level of private financial transfers. Among them are 
the savings capacity of an emigrant and his (or her) level of integration with, 
and standard of living in, the host country, on one side. On the other side are 
the opportunities to invest and the socio-economic status of returnees in the 
homeland. Of course, wealth is an important factor. Regarding the Comoreans 
abroad, for instance, remittances from metropolitan France were estimated to 
reach FF30,000 per worker per year in 1991, as against FF10,000 sent home 
from the island of La Réunion, which is poorer than the metropole France.49 
In the same way, surveys of the Malian diaspora in 1996 showed that annual 
remittances from France were close to FF10, 000, compared with FF1, 000 
from Central Africa and FF300 from West Africa.50 These gradations in relative 
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affluence were also reflected in the proportion of Malian emigrants who sent 
money home, from 32% in Côte d’Ivoire to 87% in France.
Such patterns are quite common. In Scandinavia where the state is highly 
involved in social aid, Somali refugees earn more and remit more money 
than their fellow countrymen in the rest of Europe.51 Yet the wealth of an 
emigrant does not depend only on the provision of social aid he receives. 
Many rich African emigrants live in the US, where the welfare state hardly 
exists, but where they are more likely to find jobs than black Americans. Their 
average annual income is about US$30,000 as against US$21,000 for the 
latter.52 According to a small sample of 226 individuals, on average Nigerians 
in the US earn US$45,000 and remit US$3,700 per year. On the basis of an 
estimated 40,000 households, their financial transfers are therefore likely to 
total US$170 million, excluding the export of personal belongings. This is five 
times what Nigeria earns in hard currency by selling rubber.53
To earn money is of course a prerequisite for sending cash home, but it is 
not sufficient: other factors must be considered. The richest migrants are not 
automatically the first to inject money into the homeland’s development. Such 
investments are not ensured and guaranteed by governmental organisations 
such as the French Compagnie française d’assurance pour le commerce 
extérieur (Coface) or the American Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), as they would be in the case of transnational corporations. In unsecured 
business environments, migrants have to rely on family networks to protect 
their financial interests. Their investment in the country of origin tends to be 
highly emotional, but not always rational from an economic point of view. For 
a good number of migrants, diversifying their capital in developing countries is 
very risky. It would be more profitable for them to invest in pension funds and 
keep their savings in a Western bank, or to change their hard currency on the 
black market when they visit the homeland on holiday.54
Investment in the country of origin is influenced by many historical and cultural 
factors. The degree of commitment migrants feel towards their kith and kin at 
home determines the volume and frequency of remittances, and economic 
success usually causes migrants to wish to redistribute some of their wealth. 
Cape Verdeans abroad, for instance, believe in Christian brotherhood, self-
help (djuda) and solidarity (djunta môn). Emigrants from the Comores, on the 
other hand, save their money until they can afford to pay for the traditional 
grand customary wedding (anda). In the same way, Ibo migrants from Nigeria 
keep a strong attachment to the land of their ancestors; consequently, almost 
83% of those living in Cameroon remit money home once or twice a year.55
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Some investments in the homeland can be market-orientated too. For 
example, westernized Ibo migrants from Nigeria are considered to be good 
businessmen, as their tradition and religion are thought to be more adaptable 
than those of the Yoruba and the Hausa. The Ibo are said to be competitive, 
hard-working, innovative, materialistic and individualist. They respect effort, 
do not delay what can be finished on the same day, devote much attention 
to the education of their children, and save money for that purpose. Surveys 
show that they take pride in being self-made men, and distrust social parasites 
who depend on clan solidarity for their livelihoods. 56 Moreover, Ibo migrants 
are prone to invest in their homeland since the Biafra war. They see this region 
as a last resort in case of problem. Iboland provided the only safe haven for 
returnees who were expelled from Northern Nigeria by the Muslims during 
the 1966 pogroms, and for those landlords whose properties were confiscated 
in cities like Port Harcourt after the Biafrans lost the war in 1970.57
Time also plays a role. It is usually said that the longer a migrant stays away, the 
less concern he feels for his native country. Temporary expatriates often save 
as much as they can in order to remit funds. In contrast, social assimilation 
entails more spending in the country of immigration, especially when a worker 
settles, marries and raises his children there. In many cases, political and 
financial commitments to the homeland seem to have a negative correlation 
with social integration abroad. Consequently some armed movements have 
put pressure on “their” diasporas not to settle down in the host country, so that 
they would use their resources for the struggle “at home”.58
The loyalty of migrant communities is complex. Political apathy in developed 
countries can cause migrants to feel a lack of commitment for their homelands. 
Also, the involvement of immigrants in local politics can prevent them from 
taking part in transnational action. It is doubtful whether the Nigerians who 
were elected to municipal councils in Italy feel they have a role to play in Africa. 
The same question could be raised about Ayaan Hirshi, a Somali refugee who 
was a candidate for the Liberal Party in the Netherlands in January 2003.
However, the social integration of an immigrant and his (or her) acquisition of 
a family abroad do not always weaken the link with the homeland or the will 
to return. There is no obvious correlation between the length of time a migrant 
spends in another country and the loyalty felt towards the country of origin.59 
On average, Basotho workers in South Africa stay there three to six times longer 
than Mozambican or Zimbabwean immigrants. Yet they keep very much in 
touch with their native land. According to surveys, approximately 90% of them 
own a house in Lesotho and 89% send money home. This is especially true of 
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men in their forties who have a job and a family. This proportion is much higher 
than amongst Mozambican or Zimbabwean migrants, even if the amount sent 
in remittances is nearly the same: around R320 per household every month 
.60 Unlike other African migrant communities in South Africa, the Basotho 
do not regard migration in a negative light. Only 3% of them consider that 
emigration has a bad effect on the homeland. The unique situation of Lesotho 
as an enclave within South Africa explains this attitude. The two countries 
have always had a very close relationship, and the border tends to be porous, 
despite attempts at control. On the whole, 81% of Lesotho’s population have 
visited South Africa at least once.61 From a cultural point of view, one can 
hardly differentiate a Basotho from a black South African. As in the case of the 
seTswana of Botswana and the isiSwazi of Swaziland, there are more Sesotho 
speakers in South Africa than in Lesotho: over three million according to the 
1996 census, as opposed to two million in the kingdom.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POLITICAL VALUE OF REMITTANCES 
CAPE VERDE, COMORES AND LESOTHO
The level and the frequency of remittances are important components of the 
balance of payments in the recipient countries. Yet the transformation of such 
economic power into political influence is another issue to be analyzed. There 
seems to be no necessary connection between financial contributions and 
political participation. Countries that receive huge sums in remittances are not 
automatically the ones where the diaspora plays an important political role, 
and vice versa. Also, as migrant communities are often scattered, they seldom 
share sufficient common interests to constitute a homogeneous lobby capable 
of co-ordinated action. Unlike foreign aid, which is sometimes increased or 
decreased to reward or sanction developing countries, remittances are sent on 
a private basis, usually to individuals or families, and cannot be earmarked for 
other purposes. In small countries that are highly dependent on international 
assistance, aid can be used as a convenient diplomatic tool by donor 
countries. In the Comores, for instance, France halted most of its co-operation 
programmes to “punish” the regime of Ali Soihili, which claimed that Mayotte 
Island should have become independent in 1975. In Marxist Cape Verde too, 
aid was used in the 1980s as an incentive to liberalize the economy and end 
the one-party system. As for Lesotho, the US withdrew financial assistance 
when the government was dismissed and the parliament dissolved by the king 
in 1994.
But remittances do not work in the same way. Since they provide a basic means 
of survival for the relatives of the migrants, they cannot simply be stopped to 
put pressure on authoritarian regimes to organise democratic elections or to 
respect human rights. When exchange controls become stricter, remittances 
are reduced in number or sent by alternative informal channels. In other 
words, the political impact of remittances is largely dependent on the structure 
of the state and of the domestic economy. This is the central argument of 
this monograph. The absolute size of migrant communities is not enough to 
guarantee their political weight. Hence Nigeria, the most populated country on 
the continent, has the biggest African diaspora. Yet Nigerians abroad constitute 
a tiny fraction of the national population, and, as we have seen, they have not 
had much influence on local politics in the homeland since independence. 
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Yet in contrast, Somali refugees play an important role in their war-torn 
country, and are involved in various aspects of the peace process. The Somali 
diaspora, which is one of the poorest in the West, is not only very active in the 
Horn of Africa but is perceived by the populace as being very rich.
The question, then, is: does political transnational power really depend on 
the relative size of migrant communities? This question can be answered by 
using Cape Verde, the Comores and Lesotho as case studies, because their 
economies are heavily reliant on remittances.
Cape Verde
Like Mauritius and South Africa, Cape Verde seems to be an African country 
with a well-organised diaspora. Migrants were not only instrumental in 
ending the one-party system in 1991, but also in supporting the struggle 
against the Portuguese to gain independence. The Marxist Partido Africano 
da Independência da Guiné e Cabo-Verde (PAIGC) was originally founded 
in Guinea Bissau and backed by nationalist migrant workers. It had no 
presence in Cape Verde before the islands were granted independence in 
1975. Until the breakaway of Guinea Bissau in 1980, it was predominantly 
African, as distinct from the Crioulo and Lusophone culture on the islands. 
After having been renamed the Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo-
Verde (PAICV) in 1981, the party started to lose support in the diaspora, as 
a new generation that was disillusioned with socialism emigrated. The União 
Caboverdiana Independente e Democrática (UCID), which had been launched 
in 1974 to oppose the PAIGC in exile, especially in Boston and Rotterdam, 
advocated multi-party elections. The Movimento para a Democracia (MPD) 
won the democratic elections of 1991, but the new regime was marred by 
mismanagement and corruption that did not inspire confidence. In 2001, the 
diaspora voted for the PAICV.
There were several reasons for this reversal. First, because it lacked permanent 
structures, the MPD was less able to mobilize support in the diaspora, being 
less well organized than the Marxist PAICV cells in exile. Second, Cape 
Verdeans in the US remained loyal to the PAICV, even if they were said to be 
prone to vote for the Republicans in America. As they were richer and better 
educated than other communities in the diaspora, they had greater power to 
oppose colonialism, unlike the Cape Verdeans in France or Portugal, who were 
closely watched by the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) in 
the years before the islands gained independence. The “younger” members of 
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the diaspora in Europe had experienced the one-party system from the inside 
and had been directly hurt by its radical policies, and therefore supported 
the opposition in the 1980s. In contrast, the “older” Cape Verdeans in the 
US continued to back, and vote for, the PAICV in 1991, 1995, and 2001. 
Regionalism also contributed to this trend. Some islands are linked to specific 
migrant communities in other countries: Brava and Fogo to the US, and São 
Nicolau to Holland, France and Italy. The Cape Verdean president, Pedro 
Pires, who was voted into office in 2001, comes from Fogo, which explains the 
support his candidacy was given by the diaspora in America.
However, such voting patterns cast doubt on the capacity of Cape Verdeans 
abroad to form a unified political lobby based on their crioulo monolingual 
identity. The proliferation of expatriate organisations, the dispersion of 
Cape Verdeans abroad and their integration in the host countries did not 
encourage members of the diaspora to pursue common aims. The older 
migrant communities were usually concentrated in ports such as Lisbon, 
Boston or Rotterdam. In Portugal, where the number of Cape Verdeans is 
estimated at 83,000, 90% of them are to be found in Greater Lisbon. In 
Holland, 85% of Cape Verdeans, or 14,000 individuals, live in Rotterdam.1 
In the US, where more than 46,000 residents reported at least one person 
of Cape Verdean ancestry in their families in the 1990 census (as against 
18,000 in 1980), 58% are located in Massachusetts. Some districts like New 
Bedford in Boston or Delfshaven, which accommodates almost half of the 
Cape Verdeans in Rotterdam, are strongholds where proximity helps to foster 
a sense of communal identity. Yet in France, the 21,000 Cape Verdeans who 
were counted during the 1999 census are more widely scattered, especially in 
the suburbs around Paris like Clamart, Sarcelles, Clichy and Malakoff. Another 
factor is that the diaspora in Europe did not always settle in the country of 
arrival, and therefore became more dispersed. For instance, some manual 
workers followed Portuguese migrants to Luxembourg, where they now 
number 1,700 according to official statistics. The actual figure may be 4,000, 
almost 1% of the total population, which would make it the highest ratio of 
Cape Verdeans in any foreign country.
In any case, neither the concentration nor the embeddedness of migrant 
settlements entail a close link with the homeland. Fewer than half of the Cape 
Verdeans in the US still speak crioulo. In Portugal, less than 19% belong to 
local expatriate associations, and most of the latter focus on culture rather 
than politics. According to the archipelago’s embassy in Lisbon, only 40% of 
Cape Verdeans in Portugal use their right to vote in the host country, and 
this proportion falls below 28% when it comes to elections in the homeland.2 
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The situation is similar to that of France, where 70% of those Cape Verdeans 
on the voters’ roll participated in the 2001 elections, but there were very 
few who had registered.3 Political apathy seems even more prevalent in 
Africa, where Cape Verdean creoles used to avoid mixing with the indigenous 
population. As Catholics living in Muslim Senegal, Cape Verdeans enjoyed the 
status of “civilised” persons, saw themselves as Portuguese and provided little 
support to the domestic struggle for independence. In Angola, Guinea-Bissau 
and São Tomé, they were used as colonial auxiliaries of the Portuguese. This 
collaboration created acrimony. It also encouraged the breakaway of Guinea-
Bissau, whose president, Luis Cabral, himself a Cape Verdean, was removed 
by a coup d’état in 1980.
To sum up, the role of the diaspora was important, but not sufficient to bring 
about any major political change on the archipelago. Local dynamics were 
more instrumental in this regard. In point of fact, the liberalisation of the 
economy and the replacement of the one-party system were introduced by 
the PAICV itself during a congress in 1988, when it was agreed that multiple 
candidatures were to be allowed in local elections. Moreover, the contribution 
of the diaspora to the empowerment of a new elite was probably limited. 
Because the upper class could emigrate more easily and prosper in their new 
countries, Cape Verdeans abroad did not disrupt the existing hierarchy and 
their remittances often strengthened social inequalities. All things being equal, 
the richest islands like Boa Vista and São Nicolau, for instance, got more 
funding from the diaspora. On the contrary, a poorer island like Santo Antão, 
whose economy was based on agriculture, received much less remittances 
because its migrant communities consisted of peasants who worked as casual 
labourers and earned little.4
The Comores
In contrast to Cape Verdeans abroad, the diaspora from the Comores appears 
to be much more disorganised. Before independence in 1975, some anti-
colonial migrant groups were formed, such as the Mouvement de libération 
des Comores (MLC) in Marseilles, the Front National Uni des Comores (FNUC) 
in Nairobi and the Mouvement de Libération National des Comores (Molinaco) 
in Dar Es-Salaam in 1961.5 But their influence on the homeland and on the 
French government was negligible. No armed movement was ever started 
on the archipelago. After independence had been achieved, these groups 
experienced internecine divisions. Some opposed the Marxist Association des 
Stagiaires et Étudiants des Comores (ASEC), which was founded in 1967, and 
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the Socialist Parti Socialiste Comorien (Pasoco), which backed the revolutionary 
regime of Ali Soilih in Moroni. After Ali Soilih was ousted by a former president, 
Ahmed Abdallah, and mercenaries in 1978, a group of the former’s supporters, 
the Organisation de la Jeunesse Comorienne (OJC), went into Algeria to launch 
the Conseil National pour un Parti Alternatif aux Comores (CNPAC) in 1979. 
ASEC stayed in Paris, and set up a Democratic Front in 1982 whose leaders 
were arrested during a failed coup in 1985.
Back from exile in France, Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim may have been the only 
presidential candidate to receive massive support from the diaspora through 
his party, the Union Nationale pour la Démocratie aux Comores (UNDC), 
which won the 1996 elections. Others were not as successful. In 2002, 
Colonel Azali Assoumani, who had seized power in a coup in 1999, was not 
welcomed when he toured migrant communities in France to persuade them 
to invest in the homeland and back his government. Despite their claims that 
they were preparing for a smooth transition to a democratic government, the 
military in Moroni arrested returnees campaigning for the election, accusing 
them of plotting against the government. They also claimed that the returnees 
were infringing the new electoral code, which barred candidates who had not 
been resident in the Comores during the previous six months from standing. 
Returnees who eventually took part in the election in April 2002 were low-
profile figures. Among them were Mohamed Zeina, a man from Mbéni and a 
former prefect in France; Saïd Saïd “La Guerra”, previously a Finance Minister 
under Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim and a civil servant in the French Foreign 
Office in Paris; and Saïd Larifou, a lawyer in La Réunion Island and the founder 
of a small party, the Rassemblement pour une Initiative de Développement 
avec une Jeunesse Avertie (Ridja). As for those exiles who attempted to launch 
a raid on the military, they failed miserably. In 2001, a lack of fuel left the 
mercenaries paid by Achirafi Said Hachim, a former Home Affairs Minister 
under Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim, stranded on Mohéli island.
The political role played by the diaspora is not related to its size. Some 
Comoreans tend to exaggerate its importance because they see that the 
domestic affairs of the islands are still influenced by France. But this perception 
is distorted. Not all migrants are politically aware and many of them are 
illiterate. At home they stay close to their native villages and do not think 
about their country in terms of national issues. On the other hand, those 
migrants who belong to the educated elite do not participate in the grassroots 
organisations favoured by the peasants. The diaspora is very fragmented, and 
reproduces the social divisions of the islands: the bushmen (wamatsaha) and 
the urban nobles (kabaila) in Anjouan, the descendants of slaves and of princes 
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in Grande Comore, and so on. As a result, migrants are not considered an asset 
by political leaders like Ali Mroudjae, the former Prime Minister of President 
Ahmed Abdallah and founder of the Parti Comorien pour le Développement et 
le Progrès (PCDP), now the leading party on Grande Comore island.6
The dispersion of Comoreans abroad also prevented the formation of a unified 
political lobby. Before independence, it was quite easy to travel because the 
archipelago was French territory, governed as part of Madagascar from 1914 
and 1947. For historical, geographical and religious reasons, Grande Comore 
was connected with Eastern Africa, Zanzibar, La Réunion and France, whereas 
Anjouan was closer to Mayotte and Madagascar. But after independence, the 
Comoreans were no longer entitled to French citizenship. In Zanzibar in 1968 
and in Madagascar in 1975, hundreds of them were expelled or slaughtered. 
This forced them to explore alternative migration routes and other destinations, 
for example Britain and Germany.7 Today, France continues to accommodate 
half of the Comorean migrant workers abroad: maybe 40,000 in and around 
Paris and 30,000 in Marseilles, especially in the northern suburbs and the old 
Panier district. But the new Schengen regulations have barred the direct entry 
of Comoreans to France. Migrants therefore have to travel to Europe via La 
Réunion or Mayotte. (One-third of the diaspora are now said to live in the 
latter.)8 As Muslims, many more Comoreans went to the Gulf, especially to 
Saudi Arabia, to pursue religious studies.
In a way, the wide distribution of the diaspora reflects the political fragmentation 
of the archipelago (Anjouan and Mohéli seceded in 1997). The proliferation of 
migrant organisations abroad illustrates this dispersal. Of the 350 Comorean 
associations in France, only 130 seem to be operational. Sixty are registered; 
and none is representative of the whole diaspora, not even the Fédération des 
Comoriens de Marseille (Fecom) or the Association des Travailleurs Comoriens 
(ATC), a kind of African trade union founded in 1973.9 Different migration 
patterns from one island to another also explain the political fragmentation 
of the Comoreans abroad. Despite a higher density of population, Anjouan 
does not have as big a diaspora as Grande Comore.10 Its migrants are said to 
be more individualistic than other Comoreans. Once settled abroad, they tend 
to lose contact with the homeland. For instance, they did not try to mediate 
in any way after the island seceded in 1997. Some analysts argue that this 
was a major reason for the continuation of the civil war and the perpetuation 
of internecine divisions. In contrast, migrants from Grande Comore belong 
to larger families, practice levirate, and are more involved in the domestic 
affairs of the homeland. While the anda (wedding) ceremonies are restricted 
to the urban aristocracy in Anjouan, in Grande Comore they extend to the 
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whole village. Also, in the latter the peasants raise funds to support a native 
student abroad. In return, the migrant is expected to buy something for the 
community: for example a generator or a water pump. Unlike the Anjouanais, 
migrants from Grande Comore return home when they retire, and are buried 
in the village when they die.
Some scholars also argue that emigration has not changed social hierarchies. 
Historically, only the upper class travelled, especially the aristocracy of 
the sultan in Anjouan (merchants, ship-owners, slave traders to Zanzibar, 
deported princes), and landlords whose property had been confiscated by the 
French. The emigration of peasants and formers slaves from Grande Comore 
was to follow later, when the colonial armies and shipping companies started 
employing soldiers and sailors (the so-called “navigators”). After the islands 
gained independence, economic crisis and civil war eventually prompted 
many more Comoreans to try their luck in Europe, often by travelling via 
Mayotte. The proportion of migrants from Grande Comore rose from 50% 
in 1945 to 90% today. But the poorer migrants continue to pay homage to 
their local chiefs, and to raise funds for them. Village allegiance has remained 
stronger than social class.11 Returnees have also been co-opted through the 
anda ceremonies, which confirm traditional social structures by conferring 
on the bridegroom the status of a “full man”, which in turn allows him to 
participate in the deliberations of the Council of Elders. 
Lesotho
Compared with those of Cape Verde and the Comores, the diaspora from 
Lesotho in South Africa is unique, not because of its organisation, but because 
Basotho migrants do not regard themselves as foreigners in South Africa. Until 
1963, there were no immigration controls, and no identification documents 
were necessary to enable Basotho to cross the border. Being the inhabitants 
of an enclave country gave these migrant workers special characteristics. They 
seldom settled in South Africa and had no sense of being a diaspora. However 
their political links with the homeland also followed patterns that can be found 
elsewhere in Africa, particularly as related to plots by exiles and involvement 
in armed struggles.
Before Lesotho was granted independence in 1966, family divisions within 
the monarchy had already affected Basotho migrants. The competition 
for the throne between Letsie I, Molapo and Masupha, three sons of King 
Moshoeshoe, divided their followers, both in Lesotho (the Matsieng in the 
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North, and the Matsekha of Peka and Thaba Bosiu in the South) and in 
South Africa (in Vereeniging in 1947; in Evaton in 1950; and in Newclare, 
a Johannesburg township, in 1954).12 Modern politics after independence 
also produced refugees. Following the general election in January 1970, for 
instance, King Moshoeshoe went into exile for 11 months after the government 
had declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution. He had to 
flee again when Major-General Justin Lekhanya took over the king’s executive 
and legislative powers in March 1990.13
Forced migrations across the border went the other way round as well. During 
the South African War (1899–1902), Basutoland (as Lesotho was then called) 
was a British base which sheltered many destitute white refugees from the 
Free State. After 1948, Lesotho accommodated ANC exiles who had taken 
part in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. These asylum seekers 
were to become a source of major dispute between the two countries, 
even though most aspects of domestic politics in Lesotho were influenced 
by Pretoria. As early as 1965, the conservative, Catholic, aristocratic Basotho 
National Party (BNP), led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, won the elections because 
the party was favoured by both the colonial administration and the South 
African government. The BNP’s opponent in the election was the nationalist, 
Protestant, anti-aristocratic Basotho Congress Party (BCP), which had been 
founded by Dr Ntsu Mokhehle in 1952. 
The events that followed were to confirm the importance of cross-border 
politics. After a bungled coup attempt in 1974, the BCP split into external and 
internal wings. The latter was persuaded to join a government of “national 
reconciliation”, while the BCP members who had gone into exile in Botswana 
formed the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). This was initially supported by the 
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and its forces were trained first in Libya and 
later in Syria and Tanzania. As Botswana refused to provide a sanctuary for 
the LLA and the PAC was riven by internal disagreements, the BCP found itself 
lacking support. It had no alternative but to operate under the umbrella of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa after 1978. Armed incursions into Lesotho 
from Botswana would in any case have been logistically impossible. So the LLA 
established bases in the South African homelands of QwaQwa and Transkei 
near the border of Lesotho.14
There was no ideological affinity between the LLA and the apartheid regime, 
but the former was considered by many to have the potential to act as a 
counter-revolutionary terrorist force like the Resistência Nacional Mozambicana 
(RENAMO) in Mozambique. It was used by Pretoria to put pressure on Lesotho 
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to deport the Nationalist regime’s opponents who had sought refuge there: 
liberals like the editor Donald Woods, or cadres of the liberation movements. 
An example of the latter was Chris Hani, the leader of the South African 
Communist Party, who took up residence near Maseru in 1974. As a tool 
in the hands of the apartheid security forces, the LLA never became a “real” 
liberation army. The number of attacks it made on Lesotho decreased after 
the South African Prime Minister, Pieter Willem Botha, met Chief Leabua 
Jonathan in August 1980 to negotiate the withdrawal of the LLA in exchange 
for Maseru’s clamping down on ANC activities.
Soon the LLA became completely redundant, because Pretoria decided to 
intervene in Lesotho’s domestic affairs directly. In December 1982, the South 
African army staged a raid on ANC refugee safe houses in Maseru, in which 
dozens of people were killed. Then in April 1984, South Africa applied strict 
border controls on its main frontier with Lesotho, resulting in food shortages 
in that country. Pretoria sent an ultimatum to the Lesotho government that 
it should either expel the 3,000 South African refugees it was harbouring or 
face the economic consequences. The following year, Pretoria tried to coerce 
Lesotho into signing a joint non-aggression pact similar to the Nkomati Accord 
it had concluded with Mozambique in March 1984. In January 1986, South 
Africa blockaded its border with Lesotho and supported a coup staged by 
Major-General Justin Lekhanya, whose paramilitary force toppled Chief 
Leabua Jonathan. The new government proved to be more amenable to South 
Africa’s policy on regional security. A week after the coup, 60 members of the 
ANC were deported from Lesotho, and the South African blockade was lifted. 
Pretoria gave military equipment to the Lesotho Defence Force, and the South 
African Police were granted the right to pursue criminals over the border. 
The LLA was disbanded in 1989, and the two factions of the BCP reunited 
under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle, who had returned from exile in 1988. 
During the election of March 1993, many migrant workers poured back over 
the border to vote, largely for the BCP, which swept to power. The government 
attempted to integrate former LLA activists into the Lesotho Defence Force, 
but they continued to be a source of disruption. In November 1993, a mutiny 
occurred that was apparently precipitated by a proposal that the military should 
be placed under the command of a senior member of the LLA. Skirmishes 
followed, parliament was dissolved, the constitution suspended again, and the 
Mokhehle government was dismissed in August 1994. In May 1998, another 
round of elections provoked further violence. Thousands of people fled to the 
countryside or to South Africa. 
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Since then, hundreds of Maseru businessmen have moved their places of 
residence to the border town of Ladybrand. A few have bought farms on the 
Free State side of the Calendon River.15 This elite has joined the professionals 
who moved to South Africa to escape the burden and oppressiveness of royal 
rule in Lesotho.
To sum up, cross-border politics have always been a major determinant of 
governmental affairs in Lesotho. Yet this does not mean that the Basotho 
diaspora exerts much influence. Remembering the brutality of the BNP 
dictatorship in the 1970s, migrant workers are said to support the “progressive 
parties”, the BCP and its offshoot, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). 
But because there are no facilities in South Africa for migrants to cast their 
ballots, they usually have to return to Lesotho to vote during the weekend. 
If the election takes place on a weekday, they are excluded. In 1965, one 
year before independence, a large number of migrant workers, the majority of 
whom inclined to the BCP, could not return to cast their votes on polling day. 
This was one of the reasons why the BNP won. The rural-urban divide also 
played a role. Most migrant mine-workers come from the countryside, and the 
LCD is quite active in the rural constituencies, unlike the BNP, which operates 
mainly in the urban areas.16
Historically, South Africa has been attractive to manual workers, and not to the elite. 
The members of Lesotho’s diaspora are mainly peasants who are not sufficiently 
organised to form a political lobby. Only the mine-workers are unionised, unlike 
those Basotho who work as agricultural labourers in the Free State or as domestics 
in South African towns. Yet there are fewer and fewer Basotho miners in South 
Africa, and they allege that the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) does not 
care about their fate once they have been retrenched. Derided as “bumpkins” 
(megoe), most Basotho migrants are not educated. 
For the better-educated Basotho, South Africa did not offer the same motivation 
to migrate. The churches and the colonial administration in Lesotho provided 
better educational and job opportunities for blacks than could be found under 
the apartheid regime. As British subjects who had retained their local tribal 
authorities, many Basotho considered themselves better off than their fellows 
across the border. Until recently, they did not perceive South African education 
as being progressive (that is, in tune with international trends). Even today, 
requirements in the Free State that pupils should be proficient in Afrikaans are 
still a barrier to Basotho seeking to educate their children across the border.17 
Hence the Basotho diaspora was not part of the elite; it was poorly organised 
and did not have much influence on the government in Maseru.
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Yet it was to become a major vector for change in public opinion. Many 
ordinary migrant workers now express admiration for “South Africa’s political 
modernism”. For them, sovereignty has little or no relevance, as the bulk of 
their income derives from South Africa. Unlike Mozambican or Zimbabwean 
migrants whose only claim is for economic rights, the Basotho migrants demand 
political rights. According to surveys, half of them call for a total opening of the 
border, and over a third apply for South African citizenship. These proportions 
are three times higher than amongst Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrants.18 
Interestingly enough, these demands were initially supported by the South 
African trade unions. During a congress in Johannesburg in 1991, the NUM 
vowed to end the alien status allotted to Basotho working in South Africa, 
and called for the incorporation of the enclave country into South Africa.19 
In 1996, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) even passed 
a secret motion that Lesotho and Swaziland should be assimilated by South 
Africa, if necessary by extra-parliamentary means.
The issue is not really new. Various experts have discussed the implications 
of integration, or the founding of a federation of Southern African states.20 
Pretoria first suggested the economic links between the two countries as the 
reason why Lesotho should join South Africa. As early as 1932, it was argued 
that the control of Basutoland ought to be transferred to South Africa because 
of the customs union. After 1948 the enclave country was viewed from a 
strategic perspective by the apartheid regime.21 But Lesotho refused to agree to 
political incorporation in 1949, and became independent in 1966. And South 
Africa gave up the idea of a merger with “satellites” like Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Botswana when it became a republic in 1961. Today it seems unlikely 
that South Africa wishes to incorporate Lesotho, with its extreme poverty and 
largely unskilled labour force. A greater concern of the government is the 
removal of border controls. This could lead to an influx of illegal immigrants, 
especially Chinese, who would enter South Africa from Lesotho.
Yet polls show that 41% of Basotho migrants continue to favour integration. 
Within Lesotho, 46% of respondents also support incorporation. But residents 
in the North appear most interested in the prospect of becoming part of South 
Africa, in contrast with the inhabitants of the Maseru region (56% against it), 
where the interest of many lies in preserving the status quo.22 According to 
David Coplan, 
“a small elite resist all discussion of devolution, because their 
ascendancy depends upon revenues from the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project and the Southern African Customs Union… At the 
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other end of the political and economic spectrum, the majority of 
workers/peasants straightforwardly desire the abolition of the border, 
which they see as an obstacle to local development and their own 
economic survival. Such people do not identify the Basotho nation 
with Lesotho as a nation state. On the contrary, they regard the 
Lesotho government, the senior aristocracy, and the army as existing 
only to serve their own interests”.23
The elite in power want the country to remain independent because Lesotho’s 
sovereignty provides economic opportunities both for local authorities and 
for foreign investors. The Maputo industrial area was established in 1972 at 
Ficksburg Bridge as a re-processing zone for South African exporters, so that 
they could circumvent the international sanctions that had been imposed 
because of apartheid. Later on, Taiwan and China opened clothing factories 
in Maseru because of Lesotho’s preferential access to the European and 
American markets. In such a context, the Lesotho government has good reason 
to refuse incorporation into South Africa. Instead, it would prefer to recover 
the “conquered territory” lost to the Orange Free State when the three “Wars 
of the Cannon” (Seqiti) drove the Basotho over the east bank of the Calendon 
River in June 1865, March 1867 and August 1867. This boundary, which was 
confirmed by the Second Treaty of Aliwal North, has been in dispute since 
the British annexed Basutholand in March 1868, saving king and country from 
further depredations by the Free Staters.
The BCP and the BNP raised the issue of reclaiming the lost territory at the 
United Nations (UN) in 1962. Lesotho’s claim was revived by the Jonathan 
government in November 1974. The collapse of the apartheid regime and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level in May 1992 
did not resolve the matter. Friction with South Africa continued over both the 
unresolved boundary issue and the persistent problem of cross-border cattle 
theft. The military intervention of the South African army in Maseru during the 
crisis of September 1998 exacerbated nationalist feelings. Operation Boleas, 
which ended only in May 2000, caused outrage in Lesotho and strengthened 
the opposition to incorporation with South Africa. According to polls, 72% of 
respondents said they would prefer to integrate the “conquered territory” (that 
is, the Free State province) in the hope that it would make Lesotho a more 
viable independent state.24 A much smaller number suggested that Lesotho 
should be joined with the “conquered territory”, with its regional headquarters 
at Maseru, to form a tenth province of South Africa
39Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos
The ultimate role of the state
Ultimately, it is the Lesotho government that will decide on political integration. 
The internal dynamics of the state counterbalance the weight of the diaspora’s 
wishes. Obviously, the views of Basotho migrants on the advantages of a 
greater South Africa cannot outweigh the resistance of the local aristocracy 
to incorporation. As in the Comores and Cape Verde, the contribution of the 
diaspora to the emergence of a new elite is variable. Apparently, for senior 
chiefs in Lesotho, emigration means a loss of status, privilege and economic 
resources. But successful migrants join the Councils of Elders when they return 
to their villages, and in this way strengthen existing social hierarchies.
Therefore the hypothesis that there is a correlation between political trans-
national power and the relative size of a diaspora needs to be reconsidered. 
The three case studies have shown that the influence of migrant communities 
is ultimately determined by the capacity of the homeland to capitalise on the 
diaspora’s contributions. The more organised a state is, the more effective a 
diaspora can be. In the Comores, the archipelago is as fragmented politically 
as are its migrant communities abroad. The military junta wished to encourage 
remittances, but implemented no consistent policy to bring this about. As for 
Lesotho, the state profited from the income accruing from migrant labour, but 
did not attempt to reward them by making it easier for returnees to acquire 
land.25 Between 1974–1996, the deferred payment scheme compelled 
migrant mineworkers in South Africa to withdraw their savings only at the end 
of a contract or in emergencies. By treaty, a share of their wages—reduced 
from 60% in 1979 to 30% in 1990—automatically accrued to the Lesotho 
government. The purpose was both to ensure that a higher percentage of 
money paid to Basotho mine-workers was directed towards the domestic 
economy, and to prevent migrants from falling into debt (so that their families 
at home would not suffer from a falling off of remittances). Yet the government 
did not protect migrants from the effects of retrenchment. Returnees were 
helped by private voluntary organisations, not the state.26
Only Cape Verde made an organised attempt to attract and support the 
diaspora. Launched in 1986 and renamed the Instituto das Comunidades in 
2001, the Instituto de Apoio e Protecção ao Emigrante not only promoted 
crioulo culture around the world, but also assisted the organisation of migrant 
communities. The Institute now contemplates repatriating and allocating land 
to some 12,000 Cape Verdeans from São Tomé and Príncipe.27 Of course, 
the transition to democracy helped the involvement of the diaspora in 
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domestic politics. When the one-party system came to an end in 1991, the 
new constitution allowed citizens to hold double nationality, and permitted 
migrants to vote in presidential elections.28 The diaspora was granted three 
seats in parliament, then six in 1995: two for the Americas (the US and Brazil), 
two for European countries (such as Portugal and France), and two for African 
states (like Senegal and Angola). In contrast, the military governments in 
Lesotho and the Comoros excluded migrant communities from participation 
in domestic politics.
Yet in war-torn countries like Somalia, the diaspora could also be very active 
because of the absence of the normal structures of state. This cautions us 
against overemphasising the role of democratic regimes in assessing the political 
transnational power migrant communities can wield. The only correlation 
that has been proved is with the degree of organisation of the state (whether 
authoritarian or not). Such a link, it must be said, can be worrisome. It reveals 
a kind of permeability between migrant communities and political crises in the 
homeland. Failed states export their problems abroad. In return, the political 
behaviour of some migrants sometimes reflects shady businesses at home.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DARK SIDE OF DIASPORA NETWORKING 
ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORISM
The negative aspect of diaspora networking takes two forms. First, migrants can 
directly finance and promote terrorist activities and armed struggles. Second, 
informal remittances facilitate money laundering and are open to criminal 
interference because they circumvent exchange controls and are therefore 
illegal. They provide opportunities for tax evasion, the payment of kickbacks 
for insider trading, the injection of forged currencies, the introduction of 
counterfeiting and the backing of various criminal undertakings: rackets, drugs 
and arms dealings, trafficking in organs, prostitution, kidnapping, the smuggling 
of human beings across borders and so on.
As regards the role of emigrants in providing funding for wars, the African 
diasporas are no exception to the common rule. Irish communities in 
America have supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) for many years, and 
Jewish organisations were reported to have transferred over US$400 million 
per year to Israel during the 1980s. The Lebanese diaspora, three or four 
million in number, also played a key role during their country’s civil war, 
and remitted US$2,254 billion in 1980, according to some analysts.1 Today, 
the international financial support for Hamas, which has been declared a 
terrorist organisation by Washington since 1995, exceeds US$100 million per 
year and is still flowing secretly through Arabic countries, in addition to US$2 
million from British Muslims and US$20 million from the USA. As for the 
Liberation Tigers (LTTE), the annual resources provided by the Tamil diaspora 
are estimated at approximately US$50 million. Interestingly, this guerrilla 
movement uses the African continent as a route for the transfer of money. The 
World-wide Congress of Tamils, which met in Mauritius in 2001, provided 
a good opportunity to raise funds for the cause. Several organisations in 
South Africa, such as the People Against Sri Lankan Oppression (PASLO), the 
Dravidians for Peace and Justice (DPJ), and the Tamil Elam Support Movement 
(TESM), support the LTTE. For instance, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation 
(TRO), which is based in Durban, collects money for the LTTE which is then 
channelled through Australia. In November 1998, the Liberation Tigers were 
even suspected of trying to shift their headquarters from Britain to South Africa 
to avoid the new anti-terrorist legislation being introduced in the UK.
Diasporas, Remittances and Africa South of the Sahara44
Of course, it is more common to find collecting centres for armed struggles in 
the developed world, since the poorest countries in Africa are usually at the 
receiving, not the donating, end of remittance flows. Hence during the border 
war in 1999, the Eritrean embassies in the West canvassed their migrant 
communities to raise money to fund their country’s fight against Ethiopia.2 
The involvement of diasporas in armed struggles has revealed not only the 
existence of operational groups within them, but also helped to identify key 
individuals. In June 2004, for instance, a Somali named Nourredine Abdih 
was arrested in the US on charges of financing al-Qaida. And in November 
2001, another Somali, Ahmed Noor Ali Jimale, was detained in Dubai because 
he was suspected of having remitted money to al-Itehad, an Islamist armed 
movement in the Horn of Africa.
Transferring money in contravention of exchange controls: 
From illegality to money laundering
The informal channels through which private financial transfers are sent 
allow criminal or terrorist groups to use “clean” diaspora networks to move 
“dirty” money to other countries. The problem is that most of the remittances 
transmitted to Africa south of the Sahara are not conveyed by means of formal 
banking procedures. Only 16% of the money remitted to Senegal by the so-
called modou-modou migrants, for instance, is channelled through Western 
Union. As for the Sudanese in Arab oil-producing countries before the first Gulf 
crisis in 1991, only 10% of their remittances were sent through banks. Twenty 
percent was exported as merchandise, and the remainder of payments carried 
in the form of cash by “messengers”, the tujjar al-shanta.3 This pattern explains 
the enormous discrepancies in the estimates of such financial transfers, which 
ranged between US$277 million–US$3 billion in 1983–1984, but might have 
been as much as US$5,5 billion if remittances in kind were included. Even the 
number of Sudanese working abroad was an enigma. It varied from 350,000–
550,000 in the mid-1970s: 65% of them were in Saudi Arabia, 15% in Libya 
and 5% in Egypt.
Unreliable statistics are also characteristic of Somali remittances. Their hawilad 
companies, as they are called, transfer money from the developed world to 
the Horn of Africa through two key points, Jeddah and Dubai. From these 
cities the banking system is relayed to operators who rely on individual 
connections and personal trust (amaano) as guarantees of loyalty, because the 
usual financial facilities are non-existent in this war-devastated country. Cash 
is given to the recipient in Somalia, while the bank account of the hawilad 
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operator is credited with a commission in hard currency in Dubai or Jeddah. 
In many cases, there is no physical transfer of cash. Hawilad companies use 
the proceeds of the sales of goods within Somalia to deliver the money to 
the intended recipients, while the corresponding credit earned abroad allows 
traders to buy and import merchandise from Saudi Arabia or the United Arab 
Emirates, which is a free-tax haven. All of these arrangements mean that 
transfers are impossible to trace.
This system is not specific to Somalia. It is estimated that 160,000 hawala offices 
collect some US$200 billion per year in the US, and similar arrangements are 
to be found in the Arab world and the Indian sub-continent, where they are 
called hundi, a Sanskrit word which refers to a reliable way of transferring 
money.4 The chiti “certificate” of the Hindi diaspora works like a letter of 
credit, and the Chinese abroad talk about fei ch’ien, that is, “flying money”. 
The Thai expression is phoe kuan.
Several factors explain why unofficial remittances are likely to continue under 
this kind of system. First, it is quicker, cheaper, more efficient and more 
inconspicuous than any service provided by financial institutions or companies 
like Western Union. Second, it is supported by people who do not trust banks, 
work largely outside the formal economy, and are used to avoiding state 
regulations. Third, exchange controls, lack of hard currency, poor access to 
credit, bureaucratic procedure, heavy taxation and the risk of confiscation of 
foreign assets prevent migrants from investing officially in their homelands, 
and therefore underground transfers present an attractive alternative.
As they often lack legitimacy abroad, authoritarian regimes, in particular, do 
not inspire confidence in their country’s diaspora. In 1988, for instance, the 
Nigerian military junta relaxed exchange controls and allowed citizens to keep 
hard currencies in their bank accounts. But the liberalisation of the economy 
and the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes suddenly stopped 
after another coup in 1993. So Nigerian emigrants continued to remit money 
through informal channels. In the US, less than 5% used banks to do so, and 
two out of three sent cash home through relatives or friends who were visiting 
Nigeria.5 In Cameroon, 87% of migrants participated in the so-called jiangi 
credit clubs, which were the most effective way to remit money home.6
Proximity also facilitates cash transfers from hand to hand, as is shown by 
the Basotho in South Africa who, unlike the members of other migrant 
communities, can easily come and go between the two countries without their 
having to settle in South Africa.7 Since a good number of them are not registered 
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workers, they do not use the official financial institutions. Less than 6% of their 
remittances are channelled through the banking system. Low-income migrants 
do not have bank accounts at all, and find it cheaper to send money by means 
of taxi drivers or friends. Bank-based transfer methods, whose fees are fixed 
whatever the volume of a remittance, become competitive only for amounts 
above R250.8
Yet distance does not prevent migrants from sending cash through private 
couriers. Hence the Comoreans in France give money to travellers returning 
home, to deliver to the family. Even if it is rudimentary, this system does not 
allow room for funds to be diverted, because everybody knows everybody 
else on the islands. Moreover, it is a quicker method than using the Banque 
Internationale du Commerce (BIC), a local branch of the Banque Nationale 
de Paris (BNP), which takes two weeks to transfer funds from France to 
the Comores. It is also cheaper than Western Union. The latter, which has 
operated in Moroni since the post office stopped accepting money orders in 
1998, transferred FC3 billion in 2001. Remittances are usually sent in euros, 
which are easily assimilated into an economy where 40% of transactions are 
made in cash. Migrants also send gold coins called pauni (after the English 
word “pound”) to pay for dowries and other aspects of customary weddings. 
Because the FC is freely convertible to hard currencies, the hawilad system is 
seldom used. Comorean traders in Madagascar, where exchange controls are 
tighter, transfer funds by giving credit orders on private citizen-bands. Other 
islands like La Réunion or Mayotte, do not need to resort to such strategems 
since, as French territories, they belong to the euro zone. 
Reliability and efficiency explain why African migrants remit money by these 
informal means. But the flexibility of the system also has drawbacks. Clean 
money can become dirty money because migrants are unable to control the 
management of the funds they send to show solidarity with their villages once 
these have been put at the disposal of a loose clan network. The Malians of 
Kayes in France represent a rare example of a diaspora that tries to avoid the 
diversion of remittances into useless expenditure. Half of their remittances 
take the form of food coupons that can be spent only in local co-operatives. 
But in most other cases, capital sent to home villages from abroad is wasted 
in ostentatious spending which is not directly relevant to either production 
or development, like houses, cars, electronic equipment, or drugs like qat in 
Somalia.
Thus in the Comores, remittances are intended to help families survive rather 
than to support the small private sector, the local tontines (sanduk), or the credit 
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clubs (meck) that were set up at the beginning of the 1990s. When they visit on 
holiday, the so-called je viens (“I’m coming back”) give their kith and kin many 
presents, and also build houses for the anda. Yet the development projects 
they back focus on their native villages only. As locals can hardly afford to buy 
fuel or electricity to use the equipment given to them by generous migrants 
from France, municipalities like Fombouni and Mbéni have had to tax 10% of 
the anda spending to finance and maintain necessary infrastructure.9
Remittances have also been identified as one of the reasons for Lesotho’s lack 
of economic development and diversification. One of the prime concerns of 
Basotho migrants is to acquire the capital with which to make a bohali payment 
and establish a homestead. Because most of them are landless when they leave 
their villages, mine-workers usually prefer to buy cattle or build themselves 
a house when they go home. Their communities put extreme pressure on 
migrants to remit money. This prevents them from saving money to invest. At 
best, returnees buy and rent out taxis, or become the figurehead owners of 
coffee shops that are usually run by Chinese illegal immigrants. Others spend 
their money on the education of their children in South Africa, thus starting 
a new cycle of emigration. According to surveys, only 1% of Basotho mine-
workers in South Africa own business enterprises.10 In Lesotho, the Basotho-
owned private sector is very small. It has failed to integrate with the buoyant 
foreign sector. Some analysts argue that the availability of employment 
opportunities in South Africa explains the shortage of entrepreneurship in 
Lesotho. 
In Cape Verde too, the diaspora does not seem to be inclined to become 
involved in productive activities. Because many incentives have been offered to 
attract remittances and investment, it is possible that some migrants with dual 
citizenship have registered companies as foreigners so as to gain preferential 
access to the free-trade zone in Mindelo. But in general, the private sector in 
Cape Verde is owned by former civil servants, not the diaspora. In Portugal as 
well, most Cape Verdean migrants are manual labourers, sailors, or domestic 
workers. Only 2% are professionals, and there are very few entrepreneurs 
amongst them.11 And in Holland, the Cape Verdean community has few 
traders or businessmen.12 Once back in the islands, returnees prefer to own 
houses. Many villas in the city of Assomada are said to have been built by drug 
dealers from the Netherlands.
Criminal elements can use remittances to launder money or back terrorist 
groups. This was done with the Somali hawilad during the attacks on the US 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam in August 1998. Diaspora networks 
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enable rebel movements to become global, and assist international mafias to 
stay competitive.13 In this way, migrant communities around the world can 
become strategic relays for crime syndicates. 
In Africa, Nigeria provides an interesting case study because of its high profile 
in international prostitution, drug trafficking and fraud.
The Nigerian case: “419”, prostitution and drug trafficking
Nigeria has gained a reputation for crime internationally, and more especially 
in its neighbouring countries. An economic giant and the most populated 
country on the continent, Nigeria has a frightening presence in the region. As 
early as the 1950’s, Ibo migrants in Cameroon were suspected of innumerable 
nefarious activities, including grabbing land, bribing civil servants, kidnapping 
children for human sacrifices, attacking women (and making them sterile), 
importing poisoned food, selling impure drugs, stealing church bells and 
forging currency.14 Perhaps their bad reputation had something to do with 
local beliefs in witchcraft, which are very strong along the border near Mount 
Cameroon.15 Nowadays, Nigerian migrants are still perceived collectively 
by the inhabitants of Cameroon as likely to be oil smugglers or dealers in 
stolen cars.16 These hard feelings were aggravated by the political tensions 
between the two countries. Their armies clashed in 1981, 1987, 1989 and 
1994 because of disputes concerning certain islands in Lake Chad, and the 
territorial waters around the Bakassi peninsula.17
These examples imply that the bad reputation of Nigerians in Africa is shaped by 
politics, economic competition, nationalist xenophobia and ethnic differences. 
Fear of invasion prompted the governments of Ghana in 1969 and Equatorial 
Guinea in 1976 to expel thousands of Nigerian immigrants. And in 1990, the 
landing in Monrovia of Nigerian troops belonging to the Economic Community 
of West African States’ Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) made Liberians afraid 
of a “malevolent spiritual power” that came “for sacrificial purposes”.18 After 
the Nigerian peacekeeping force had looted the port of Buchanan in 1992, 
ECOMOG was nicknamed: “Every Car Or Movable Object Gone”.
Yet the meddling of Abuja in other countries’ domestic affairs is not the sole 
reason for the bad reputation of Nigerian immigrants in Africa. Hard feelings 
also developed in Niger, which had always had a cordial diplomatic relationship 
with Nigeria.19 In two villages separated by a very short distance but located 
on either side of the Niger–Nigeria border, the Hausa communities in both 
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belonged to the same ethnic group, were all Muslim, and participated together 
in various smuggling activities.20 
The specialisation of Nigerian migrants in commerce might be a reason for 
their involvement in crime. Unlike labour migrations, commercial networks 
facilitate smuggling. The Hausa and Yoruba traded in West Africa long before 
the region was colonised and borders were drawn. In Ghana at the end of 
the nineteenth century, for example, the Hausa monopolised the kola trade 
and occupied 20% of Salaga, a little city North of the White Volta.21 As for the 
Yoruba, they were traditionally travelling salesmen, especially the so-called 
osomaalo from the Nigerian town of Ijesha since 1900. They arrived in Ghana 
after the Hausa, but were estimated to comprise 1,5% of the population of 
the country in 1960.22 Whereas the Hausa were concentrated in the North, 
the Yoruba were scattered all over Ghana. They specialised in the importation 
of textiles and the export of cocoa, and took up an intermediary position 
between the local retailers and the European or Lebanese firms until they were 
accused of tax evasion and expelled in 1969.23
Differences in the prices of goods were inducements for Nigerian migrants to 
turn to smuggling. They did so in Ghana as well as in Cameroon, Chad or Niger, 
where Nigerian peasants sold their groundnuts at artificially high prices thanks 
to Niamey’s agricultural marketing boards, which wanted to get aid from France 
and to fill their European Union (EU) quotas.24 The Republic of Benin is now 
the smuggling hub of the region, sometimes described as the thirty-seventh state 
of the Nigerian federation. To circumvent the strict regulation of foreign trade 
in Lagos, the port of Cotonou imports and re-exports tobacco, alcohol, second-
hand cars and textiles to Nigeria in exchange for petrol and agricultural products 
like cacao or palm oil. The volume of smuggling is so high that the Beninoise 
government eventually decided to legalize the transit of goods through the 
country in order to earn some income from it.25 Such activities are concentrated 
on the coastal Nigeria/Benin border in the South, for obvious reasons. One, this 
is where the market is (between Cotonou and Lagos, the biggest city in Africa). 
Two, this is where Yoruba traders live and mix with the Goun of the Republic 
of Benin, who are culturally very close to them. Three, this is where the border 
is easier to cross. In the North, in comparison, the border is a river without a 
bridge, and the low density of population prevents smugglers from hiding in the 
surrounding villages to avoid being caught by customs patrols.26
Yet although smuggling is illegal, it is not criminal. However, the Nigerian 
diaspora is also involved in organized crime. This appears to be the result of 
factors such as endemic local corruption, which facilitates illicit trafficking; 
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the Biafra civil war, which contributed to a proliferation of firearms; the oil 
boom of the 1970s, which led to the embezzlement of public funds; and the 
economic crisis of the 1980s, which was accompanied by a rise in robberies. 
The expansion of the Nigerian diaspora and organized crime went hand in 
hand. Global migration boosted prostitution, drug trafficking and fraud, the 
three main activities of Nigerian syndicates. The smuggling of Nigerian sex 
workers became a whole industry that now extends from Switzerland to France 
and Italy (where black prostitutes are called “fireflies”), and has even reached 
the prudish kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from which 1,000 women are said to be 
deported every month by the authorities.27
Drug trafficking is in a paradoxical sense, a diaspora “success story”, for Nigeria 
does not produce any cocaine, heroin, crack or ecstasy. During the last 20 
years, Nigeria has become one of the main purveyors of narcotics in the world. 
It supplied one-third of the heroin seized in the US, and more than half of 
the cocaine imported by South Africa.28 Nigerian drug pushers have become 
more sophisticated as their activities have extended to the global markets. At 
the beginning (in the 1980s), drugs were exported by casual travellers: traders 
who hid them in electronic goods; sportsmen who were invited to participate 
in international games; and military officers who abused their diplomatic 
immunity. But in the 1990s, all Nigerian migrants were inevitably suspected 
of carrying drugs. Therefore the transportation of drugs to Europe and the 
Americas was entrusted to Kenyan women or white South Africans with 
British passports. Nigerian dealers abroad had to keep a low profile—in South 
Africa, for instance, they were generally not as violent and ostentatious in their 
behaviour as the local gangsters. In a sample taken for a study conducted in 
three South African cities in 2001, no Nigerian dealers were arrested for violent 
crimes. Instead, theft, drug offences, fraud and having illegal alien status were 
the most common offences among this group.29
Eventually, the international enforcement of drug laws and intensive police 
investigations compelled the Nigerian syndicates to shift their bases to other 
locations all over the world. According to a director of the Nigerian Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Nigeria is no longer the major transit point 
for drugs it used to be.30 Small traffickers still supply the country, but the real 
barons have gone underground and now live elsewhere, where they are not 
affected by the Nigerian government’s reactivation of a 1931 extradition treaty 
with Britain, which was extended to the US by decree in 1966. The heads of 
the drug syndicates are unable to return to the homeland, especially if they 
have served jail sentences abroad, since under the Nigerian penal code they 
should be sentenced again for tarnishing the reputation of their country.
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Frauds also rely on diaspora connections for their effectiveness. A world-
wide enterprise that often uses the Internet to target businessmen, migrants, 
churches, non-governmental organisations, and even states, is run by 
Nigerians. In 2001, for instance, some Nigerians attempted to sell passports 
for the Republic of Lomar, a state which existed only on the web! Computer 
engineers were certainly involved in these scams. A Nigerian syndicate based 
in the Bronx, New York, stole credit card numbers and used them to divert 
US$2,7 million from 30,000 bank accounts in America before the gang was 
arrested and charged with fraud. They appeared in a Manhattan court in 
November 2002.
Known internationally as “419” after a section of the Nigerian penal code, 
the advance fee fraud scheme is the country’s most notorious scam. Dubious 
requests by a “son” of Sani Abacha, Mobutu Sese Seko or Robert Mugabe 
were sent out to various potential victims targeted at random, using circular 
letters, faxes and electronic messages. The fictitious sender of the messages 
asked for help in transferring African funds to a bank account abroad, offering 
to reward any person prepared to assist with a sizeable percentage as a 
commission. If interested, the intended victim was requested to forward a 
variety of documents and to pay certain fees in order to effect the transfer of 
the money into his or her bank account. It was the fees that were the whole 
object of the exercise for the criminal syndicates and freelance confidence 
tricksters who administered the scheme.
The “419” scam was not violent, but foreign businessmen attracted by the 
false promise of a quick profit in Nigeria have been kidnapped or murdered. 
Others have committed suicide because they had been bankrupted, or were 
wanted by the police in their own countries because they had embezzled 
money and could not reimburse it.
The biggest financial fraud perpetrated in Nigeria involved US$181 million 
which a Brazilian director of the Banco Noereste in São Paulo was duped 
into paying between 1996–1997.31 In the US, the loss to frauds instigated 
by Nigerians is officially in the region of US$100 million per year, probably 
US$300 million if one includes swindles that are not reported to the police 
by the victims. In 2001, “419ers” were said to have earned US$500 million 
from victims all over the world. The highest estimate is a total amount of 
US$7 billion since 1985.32 Even the World Bank has had to issue an official 
warning concerning fraudulent investment schemes that have been using 
its name. As Nigerian 419ers were arrested in Kenya, the Gambia, Ghana, 
South Africa, Canada, the US and the UK, they became a national concern in 
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Nigeria. It was asserted that they were a major explanation for the low level of 
foreign investment in the country, which had been blacklisted by the Financial 
Action Task Force, an arm of the IMF.
Such financial scams require an international organisation to operate effectively, 
since they rely on the credulity of foreigners and the impossibility of checking 
the details of a deal in Africa. In the local Nigerian context, cases of fraud and 
embezzlement were being reported as early as the 1920s. But they were not 
sophisticated crimes. (One budding forger wrote to a German firm to order 
a “machine for making money”!) At the time, the colonial market economy 
was still nascent. In the North, the Hausa disregarded banknotes, calling them 
“paper”, takada. To the Yoruba in the South, coins were “flat money”, owo 
pelebe, as opposed to the traditional cowries of an economy based on barter.33 
The level of embezzlement was low, and money obtained by theft or fraud 
was not reinvested abroad.
Then the oil boom introduced easy money to Nigeria. Gangs became 
increasingly active during the 1970s. Forgeries of hard currency and the naira 
expanded with the black market: the number of cases reported by the police 
was four times higher in the mid-1980s than in the previous decade, up to 
ten times higher for fraud.34 In the context of coups and illegitimate military 
juntas, corruption at the highest level also created a sense of impunity. Today, 
many Nigerians consider that they are not responsible for 419ers, who they 
argue are a product of capitalism and neo-liberalism.35 To them, foreigners are 
as guilty and greedy as the Nigerian conmen when they agree to transfer over-
budgeted money and so deprive developing countries of their resources.36 
Such frauds are “moral”, because they punish corruption on both sides.
The way the responsibility for international crime is allotted shows the other 
side of the same coin. The perception of crime varies with points of view. For 
example, immigrants are often blamed for a rise in violence. In Johannesburg, 
more than half of South Africans believe that immigration is the primary cause 
of the high rate of crime in the city.37 Police figures show that foreigners are 
responsible for only 14% of reported crimes, excluding offences relating to 
illegal alien status.38 But migrants are also the victims of violence. According to 
some surveys, one out of every two foreigners has been robbed while in South 
Africa, three out of four in Johannesburg, and most of them think that crime 
is lower in their own homelands.39 To migrants, their vulnerability to crime 
is as much a problem as finding a job or a decent place to live. Interestingly, 
African immigrants to Nigeria suffer from the same prejudices, in a very violent 
environment. They are treated as scapegoats and charged with many of the 
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evils that beset the country, from economic crisis to armed robbery. Hundreds 
of thousands of them were expelled for these reasons by the Nigerian 
government in 1983 and 1985.40 Yet in Lagos, only 7% of armed robbers 
detained in the famous penitentiary of Kiri-Kiri in 1990 were foreigners. (These 
were mainly from Ghana and Cameroon.)41
Perceptions of crime need to be put into perspective. As far as Nigerian 
immigrants are concerned, one should be aware that the weight of numbers 
tends to distort the degree of their involvement in illegal activities. A breakdown 
of foreign criminals by nationality show that they are often the largest African 
group in jail abroad, as they come from the most populated country on the 
continent. In Ireland, for instance, they have incurred more criticism than 
any other black nationals. African immigration to Ireland is quite new: until 
recently, it was a country of emigrants, and its immigration legislation, based 
on the jus soli, was among the most accommodating in Europe. Before it 
was amended in 2004, the country’s constitution automatically gave Irish 
citizenship to any foreign applicant born on the island, while it took three 
years for an asylum request to be processed before migrants could settle 
permanently. Unlike England, which began accepting African migrants as 
far back as the nineteenth century, Ireland was not accustomed to receiving 
black communities. Therefore the Nigerians, who represented 39% of asylum 
seekers in 2003, became the first African community in Ireland, and attracted 
most of the xenophobic feelings that resulted.
Immigration and security: Some reminders
In the light of globalisation, there is a temptation to exaggerate the part migrant 
communities play in crime, money laundering and terrorist attacks. Police 
target immigrants because they are foreigners, and so tend to overemphasise 
their role in crime. Being an illegal alien is a violation of the law, but it is not 
a criminal act, even if the closing of European and American borders tends 
to generate violence and the smuggling of human beings into countries. It is 
important not to forget the other side of the same coin: ethnic African diasporas 
that back armed struggles can also help to build peace. Examples are the role 
played by Somali refugees during the negotiations in Arta, Djibouti, in 2000 
and Nairobi, Kenya, in 2004; or by the Acholi in the UK trying to find a peace 
settlement with the Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. 
Moreover, only a fraction of funds used for crime or terrorist activities is 
channelled through remittances. Money laundering focuses on discreet 
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economic activities in general. These are carried out through bureau de 
change, import-export companies, casinos, private post offices, travel agencies, 
businesses dealing in insurance, pawnbroking, jewellery, gold and so on. In 
most cases, criminal groups prefer to use offshore formal banks that have no 
connection with migrant communities and informal remittances in cash.
The same precaution should apply to the Islamic banks that were accused of 
sponsoring terrorist networks after the attacks on America on 11 September 
2001. Founded in the 1970s in Egypt and the Gulf, Islamic banks follow the 
Shari’a, the Quraanic law that forbids usury. In the intervening three decades 
they have expanded and attracted many investors from the Arabic countries.42 
With 186 financial institutions and 18,655 branches in countries around the 
world by the beginning of the 1990s, their assets are now said to be worth over 
US$200 billion, as against US$166 billion around 1995 and US$7,6 billion in 
1985. Yet it seems that the value of their deposits, which rose from US$5,8 
billion to US$80 billion in ten years, does not represent a high proportion of 
“terrorist money”.43 The word “Islamic” is not equivalent to “fundamentalist”, 
and not all religious radicals support armed struggle. In general, the majority 
of remittances sent by the Muslim diasporas are concerned with social values, 
not politics. On average, there is little activism in these communities for either 
secular or religious revolutions. According to some surveys in the US, only one 
Arab immigrant in 30 belongs to a political organisation, as against one in three 
amongst Jewish immigrants.44
In the same way, the proportion of migrants to nationals in crime statistics 
is usually overestimated. The focus on illegal alien status makes the police 
more likely to arrest foreign than national criminals. And skin colour also fuels 
prejudice. In developed countries, blacks are easy to target, and are often 
perceived as would-be drug pushers, gangsters, counterfeiters, sex workers or 
illegal immigrants. On the other hand, as has already been noted, the number 
of foreigners who are victims of crime is underestimated. Because they do 
not trust the police (or lack proper documentation to justify their presence 
in the country), immigrants are reluctant to report crime to the authorities. 
Immigration restrictions in developed countries are a cause for concern in this 
regard, since they incite African migrants to enter countries clandestinely and 
to live in virtual hiding, which exposes them to the criminal world. As early 
as 1972 in Norway and 1974 in France, laws were enacted to limit economic 
immigration. The Schengen Convention of 1990 effectually closed the borders 
of the EU countries to immigrants from Africa, and the open-door policy of 
Northern America was brought to an end in the 1980s. As a result, requests 
for asylum became one of the last remaining means of entering rich countries, 
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which had politicised economic immigration. However, asylum laws were also 
made stricter. Only 4% of African asylum seekers are granted the right to enter 
the US nowadays, even though one out of four of all refugees in the world 
come from Africa.45 In Canada too, various bureaucratic obstacles hinder 
African asylum seekers attempting to obtain refugee status.46
Europe and Northern America are not the only regions to have resisted economic 
immigration. The Arab oil-producing countries have also restricted the issuing 
of visas, barring entry to Aids victims, for instance. Libya, the champion of 
pan-Africanism, deported thousands of Nigerian and Ghanaian immigrants in 
September 2000. According to the country’s Minister for African Co-operation 
and Economic Integration, they were miscreants who had nothing to do in an 
Arab country.47 In Saudi Arabia as well, health regulation has provided a good 
excuse to reject Africans, especially during the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is 
the main entry point for illegal immigrants.48 In 1996, Nigerian Muslims were 
refused visas to Mecca because of a meningitis epidemic in Nigeria (the official 
reason given).49 These moves contributed to the decrease of the number of 
Nigerian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, from 100,000 in 1981 to 57,000 in 1999.
When it comes to the restriction of immigration, religious Islamic brotherhood 
in Saudi Arabia or Sudan is as rigorous as secular pan-Africanist solidarity 
in Libya. In Africa south of the Sahara, Sudan was one of the first countries 
to restrict economic immigration after gaining independence in 1956. The 
reason was that many pilgrims travelling to Mecca through Sudan elected to 
live in the latter.50 According to the British colonial authorities in the mid-
1920s, 3,000 out of 8,000 Nigerian travellers crossing Sudan every year never 
reached Mecca. Only 38% of them returned to their homes, and 28% stayed 
in Sudan, where they were known collectively as Fellata.51 At independence, 
these Fellata were excluded from economic competition and the civil service, 
and they were required to prove that they had been in Sudan for ten years or 
more in order to apply for citizenship.52
In other African countries, xenophobic feelings were also on the rise. These 
were a major cause of the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. In Nigeria during the 
oil boom, which attracted many African immigrants, foreigners were often 
despised by the Yoruba, who called them ara oko in Oyo, elu in Ife and sesede 
in Lagos. In 1983 and 1985, the government deported hundreds of thousands 
of aliens, despite having signed a convention in1979, which allowed Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) citizens to circulate freely, and 
stay in Nigeria without visas for 90 days.53 In South Africa too, the sudden 
influx of African immigrants provoked negative reactions after the end of 
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the apartheid regime. In mockery of their foreign languages, West Africans 
were nicknamed amagongogo; Zimbabweans, amakalanga; Mozambicans, 
amakwerekwere. Hundreds of thousands of them were deported and South 
Africa’s immigration laws were made more stringent, despite the government’s 
official stance that the region’s human resources should be allowed to move 
freely in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.54 
According to some surveys, one South African national out of every four 
supported a total closure of the borders.55
Yet containment policies have severe drawbacks, experienced by both 
developed and developing countries alike. They force illegal immigrants to 
live in hiding, cause them to overstay visiting permits, and push them into the 
criminal world. To circumvent the Schengen regulations, for instance, Somalis 
smuggle their countrymen into Europe. Techniques used include stealing 
virgin passports, bribing the immigration authorities, manipulating their rights 
to family reunification, making false paternity or maternity claims, renting out 
legitimate European passports to members of the diaspora and filling in claims 
for lost passports in order to substitute different photographs. Containment 
policies have also contributed considerably to the creation of international 
mafias that specialise in the trafficking and smuggling of humans.
In Africa, the deportation of immigrants or settlers, as with Indian traders in 
Uganda in 1972 and white farmers in Zimbabwe after 1999, has disrupted 
domestic economies and boosted the black market. In Ghana, the forced 
departure of Nigerian immigrants in 1969 provoked a drop in cocoa 
production.56 In return, the eviction from Nigeria and repatriation of Ghanaians 
in 1983 and 1985 put the finances of the government in Accra under great 
strain.57 And in Nigeria, the prices of imported goods rose, precipitated 
inflation, exacerbated the economic crisis, and led to a massive increase in 
smuggling. These smugglers later became professional criminals.58 African 
immigrants who remained in Nigeria after 1985 had to bribe the police in 
order to live there, or went underground.59
In Lesotho in the 1990s, unemployment and rising crime were also said to be 
a consequence of the retrenchments in the mining industry in South Africa. 
Cross-border raiding and stock thefts increased after the return of the migrant 
workers. Some parts of the border became no-go areas, because Basotho 
village vigilante associations apprehended and killed cattle thieves. According 
to some authors, “the cycle is a depressing one—stock theft is a result of 
poverty, stock theft increases poverty and poverty begets more stock theft”.60
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In general, borders in Africa represent a business opportunity rather than a 
limit. This is why containment policies promote smuggling and other crimes. 
The artificial colonial border between Lesotho and South Africa is a good 
example. Illegal trade in weapons, alcohol, and stolen livestock began as 
soon as it was demarcated.61 Arms smuggling even provoked a war in 1880, 
which resulted in the collapse of Cape rule in Basutoland and a reversion to 
direct administration by the British Crown in 1884. Bootlegging expanded 
after the South African War (1899–1902), and Lesotho’s independence did 
not stop cross-border raiding, stock theft, and the “dagga for guns” trade. 
Paradoxically, the tightening of identification controls by South Africa offered 
new opportunities for corruption. At the border, officials prevented Basotho 
migrant workers with permanent South African residence stamps from using 
Lesotho passports, and tjotjo boys obtained documents or took people to the 
head of the queue on payment of a fee. The retrenchment of mine-workers 
also gave rise to shady “advice centres”, which charged money to collect 
disability or pension pay-outs for gullible returnees who believed they had not 
received what was owed to them.
The closure of borders and the deportation of illegal aliens raises a question: 
does a fall in remittances encourage crime at the highest level of government? 
Like oil-producing countries whose income is highly dependent on international 
market prices, developing economies that rely on private transfers from labour 
migrants are very vulnerable to a decline in remittances.62 Lesotho could hardly 
afford to repatriate all its nationals from South Africa, unlike Malawi, where 
the agricultural sector is very different. The latter was able to integrate over 
half of its migrant workers into the labour market with little disruption between 
1970–1976.63 In the same way, a massive deportation of Comorean or Cape 
Verdeans migrants abroad would provoke a major economic crisis on the 
islands. The main risk would be the emergence of an ersatz economy based 
on criminal business interests, as a substitute for the loss of remittance income. 
The failed state of the Comores, for instance, has already shown it is ready to 
sell its sovereignty and its territory at a price. During the apartheid regime, 
it helped South Africa and Iran to circumvent international sanctions and to 
exchange weapons for oil. In 1994, it negotiated a US$5 million contract with 
a German firm to store toxic waste. Likewise, corrupt customs officials turned a 
blind eye to the passage of the explosives that were used in the terrorist attack 
on the US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998.
Today, the Comoreans want to establish free-trade zones. These projects 
follow the model of the French colonial division of labour, and consist of an 
international airport near Moroni, a port at Moutsamoudou, and a marine 
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park in Mohéli. The free-trade zone of Grande Comore is located at the 
airport; that of Anjouan is situated near the airstrip of Ouani, a few kilometres 
away from the port of Moutsamoudou. Anjouan, which seceded from Grande 
Comore in 1997, hopes to attract entrepreneurs from Mauritius, whose own 
free-trade zone created thousands of jobs. Mauritius is now investing in luxury 
products like haute couture. A shortage of cheap and unskilled labour caused 
Mauritian textile and food industries to move to a new free-trade zone in Beira, 
Mozambique, and to invest in Madagascar. Compared with these, Anjouan 
does not sound very competitive, because of its political instability, the fragility 
of its private sector, and a lack of space at the port at Moutsamoudou, where 
goods have to be transported to the industrial area by truck or boat.
The project seems risky, from both the investment and the security points of 
view. Free-trade zones in the region (from Mauritius to the Seychelles) are 
known to be involved in money laundering. The offshore banking facilities on 
Anjouan and Mohéli are of concern because they enable money launderers 
to preserve their anonymity and to keep their financial dealings secret. Both 
islands have established central banks that are illegal according to the Comores’ 
constitution. In Fomboni, the secessionists licensed a Mwali International 
Service Authority in 2001. In Moutsamoudou, a Bureau for International 
Companies was opened in 1999, and registered 20 firms in the three years 
following. It was closed in 2004. Managed from La Réunion island, its website 
also offered credit card services on the Internet. A British firm (DS) with a 
Russian representative in Moutsamoudou developed captive banking to enable 
companies to have their own financial facilities. In 2004, the secessionists 
backed a rival, the Offshore Financial Authority, which operates in association 
with the Global Bank.
Unlike the Comores, the Republic of Cape Verde is not a failed state. In fact, 
it could be transformed into an important offshore banking centre, not least 
because it has the highest density of fixed telephone lines in Africa, with 
64,000 subscribers in 2001, as against 21,000 in 1995. Two offshore banks 
operate in Cape Verde since a law was enacted in 1997. These are the Banco 
Fiduciário Internacional and the Banco Insular of José Luís Fernandes, a former 
PAICV minister and ambassador to the US. Fernandes has good contacts in 
Angola and owns a factory that processes diamonds (which officially come 
from Guinea Conakry, but may originate in Sierra Leone) on Sal Island. Cape 
Verde also plans to develop gambling by building a casino in Praia, and to 
establish a further free-trade zone on Sal Island. In 1993, a law was passed 
which permitted enterprises producing goods and services exclusively for 
export to benefit from exemptions on tax and customs duties. In 1999, other 
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legislation provided for the transformation of the industrial parks at Mindelo 
and Praia into free-trade zones.64 Meanwhile, Cape Verde established a flag 
of convenience in 1997, and an international ship registration agency was 
founded in Mindelo by investors from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the US.
In the same way that the Comores accommodated Iran and South Africa in the 
1980s and Lesotho makes room for Chinese and Taiwanese textile factories 
today, poverty stricken Cape Verde may be ready to rent itself out for a price, 
sometimes to buyers at war with each other. Located in the middle of the 
Atlantic Ocean, Mindelo was an important coal station for British ships on their 
way to America in the nineteenth century. During the Cold War, the airport 
on Sal Island was a strategic refuelling point for South African Airways, which 
was banned from flying over the continent because of international sanctions 
against apartheid. Until 1992, it was also a transit point for Cuban troops going 
to fight in Angola against the South African military who supported the União 
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)! Since then, the 
former Marxist Republic of Cape Verde can no longer depend on support from 
the West or the East. But other groups are still interested in the archipelago 
and some of the desert islands used by drug traffickers.
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CONCLUSION
The Republic of Cape Verde is not exceptional. Micro-states with few or no 
natural resources are likely to put their territory at the disposal of anyone ready 
to pay a lump sum, perhaps even including criminal organisations. Islands in 
the Pacific or the Caribbean have set up free-trade zones and offshore banking 
centres. In Africa, only Mauritius and the Seychelles have possessed sufficiently 
sophisticated infrastructure to offer real financial services and attract foreign 
investment.1 Other countries have tried in vain to do the same, as in Somalia, 
where the Transitional National Government established a Somali International 
Financial Centre in 2003 amidst the ruins of the capital city, Mogadishu.
In such a context, because their domestic economies are highly dependent on 
the diaspora, island micro-states, enclaves and countries ravaged by war may 
be forced by the deportation or retrenchment of migrants and the concomitant 
drop in remittances to consider criminal activities as a source of income. After 
the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, for instance, 
the closure of Somali hawilad by the US created more than a humanitarian 
problem for vulnerable families who relied on financial support from their 
relatives abroad. Analysts were also concerned about a possible upsurge in 
drugs and arms trafficking resulting from the loss of remittance income. Since 
then, most of the hawilad companies have resumed their activities. Under 
pressure from the international community, a Somali Financial Services 
Association was launched in London in December 2003 to establish an Anti-
Money Laundering Compliance Guide for Hawala. Yet self-regulation will 
hardly prevent criminal groups from abusing the system.
The dilemma can be summed up as follows: Informal private transfers from 
migrant communities can be used to support armed struggles or terrorist attacks, 
or to facilitate money laundering. But a crackdown on illegal immigration and the 
sending of remittances can provoke economic crisis in the homeland, encourage 
the black market, and force failed states to resort to radical solutions, including 
war or crime. Founded as remedies for a loss of income, offshore banks and 
free-trade zones present a global threat, partly because they are much more 
effective as a means of laundering money than remittances.
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To sum up, remittances have both positive and negative consequences.2 To 
believe that they make sustainable development in the home country possible 
and prevent further migration towards the “western eldorado” is naïve. 
Remittances cannot replace foreign direct investment, and the capital is usually 
wasted on showy spending which is not directed towards the development of 
agricultural or industrial production. 
However, to deny the impact of remittances would also be a mistake. Even if 
African migrants do not have the financial power of the Chinese diaspora or the 
sophistication of Jewish expatriate organisations, they play a crucial economic 
and social role in countries where poverty is widespread and remittances are 
essential to survival. In the context of politics, diasporas are also important 
actors, although their influence has to be assessed over the long term. Because 
exiled parties often fail to organise and co-ordinate a common front against an 
authoritarian regime, it appears that informal migrants’ networks participate 
only indirectly in encouraging transitions to democracy in their homelands. 
Eventually, diasporas must be understood for what they are: major vectors 
for modernisation and technology transfers. One must not overemphasise 
their capacity to influence governmental policies in either the countries of 
emigration or of immigration. Therefore the author suggests that three main 
issues arising in this monograph would repay further research. These are the 
impact of exile politics, remittances and return migrations.
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